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For Unifying Servitudes and Defeasible Fees:
Property Law's Functional Equivalents
Gerald Korngold*
While property scholars have argued persuasively for a unified law of servitudes
and for a unified law of defeasible fees, Professor Korngold argues that further unifica-
tion is necessary: the law should integrate servitudes and defeasible fees involving land
use controls. Because these interests are functional equivalents, judicial results should
not depend on the historical label attached to the interest. Courts should address the
tension between freedom of contract and free alienability values that inhere in both
interests. Professor Korngold focuses on significant issues that arise in both defeasible
fees and servitudes contexts, including the forfeiture remedy, ownership in gross, per-
missible subject matter, and termination and modification doctrines. A unified law
can resolve these important issues satisfactorily and accommodate the intentions of
parties who create land use controls. Either the courts or legislatures can accomplish
this unification, which would further the goals of a modern, integrated property law.
I. Introduction
Real property law has developed many distinct interests designed to
allocate to their holders a nonpossessory right in land-covenants, equi-
table servitudes, easements, rights of entry, possibilities of reverter, and
executory interests.' Although these interests are functional equivalents
evoking similar policy concerns, classical legal theory gives each a sepa-
rate label and a distinct set of doctrinal rules. In this fragmented legal
universe, the label is often the key to results. Arcane rules divert deci-
sion makers' attention from underlying policy issues and the larger fabric
of private land use rights. History, doctrinal mystique, and separate ju-
risprudential origins help to perpetuate the disunity.
Commentators in recent years have articulated convincing argu-
ments for the abolition of classical distinctions between the fee simple
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School. B.A. 1974, J.D. 1977,
University of Pennsylvania. The author is grateful to Susan French, Quintin Johnstone, Carol Rose,
and David Schoenbrod for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The author, of
course, is responsible for all errors and views.
1. This list is not exhaustive. Licenses are also nonpossessory rights in land; they are not
discussed in this Article, but might be analogized to easements for some purposes. Covenants, equi-
table servitudes, and easements are present rights. Rights of entry, possibilities of reverter, and
executory interests are future interests associated respectively with fees simple on condition subse-
quent, fees simple determinable, and fees simple on executory limitation. Upon termination of the
fee by the occurrence of the stated event (and for a fee simple on condition subsequent, action by the
future interest holder), the future interest holder will have a possessory estate. Until that time, the
restricion on the fee owner related to the stated event gives the future interest holder the equivalent
of a current nonpossessory right. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 23-25, 4446 (1936).
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subject to a condition subsequent and the fee simple determinable. 2 Con-
sistent with those views, this Article treats the two estates as a single
interest-a fee on condition. Commentators also have criticized the false
distinctions between fees on condition and fees simple subject to execu-
tory limitation. 3 In this Article, defeasible fee refers collectively to fees
on condition and fees on executory limitation4 and condition refers to the
limiting conditions in both interests.5 In addition, a number of commen-
tators recently have urged the integration of covenants at law, equitable
servitudes, and easements into a single interest known as a servitude.6
2. See, eg., Chaffin, Reverters, Rights of Entry, and Executory Interests: Semantic Confusion
and the Tying Up of Land, 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 303, 320-22 (1962) (arguing that distinctions
between possibilities of reverter, rights of entry, and executory interests result in uneven regulation
of future interests under the Rule Against Perpetuities); Dunham, Possibility of Reverter and Powers
of Termination-Fraternal or Identical Twins?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 234 (1953) (arguing that
courts should "frankly put the decision whether to grant relief from forfeiture or not on the ground
of need and intention"); Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices To Restrict
the Use of Land, 54 HARV. L. REV. 248, 274-75 (1940) (concluding that distinctions among grant-
ors' interests are only verbal); McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus Clarification
and Reform, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1090-93 (1942) (criticizing the Restatement of Property for
perpetuating unjustified distinctions through a "maze of ambiguous and easily reversible rules" that
lack a "persuasive and consistent theme"); Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A
Proposal for Legislative Action, 85 HAriV. L. REV. 729, 752-53 (1972) (arguing for "a reformulation
... which assures that [all] property interests which in substance operate the same way are grouped
in the same categories even though they may be stated differently in form"); see also Jost, The
Defeasible Fee and the Birth of the Modern Residential Subdivision, 49 Mo. L. REV. 695, 708-10
(1984) (observing that distinctions amcng fees on condition mean little to courts and drafters of deed
restrictions); Powell, Determinable Fees, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 231 (1923) (noting that Illinois
courts-have been careless in using the term "defeasible fee"); Simes, Restricting Land Use in Califor-
nia by Rights of Entry and Possibilities ofReverter, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 293, 298-99 (1962) (noting that
California courts construe the scope of a condition or limitation narrowly to prevent forfeiture);
White, Bringing Tennessee into the Twentieth Century Re Possibilities ofReverter, Powers of Termina-
tion and Executory Interests When Used as Land Control Devices, 16 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 555, 562-
74 (1985) (pointing out the Tennessee courts' history of inconsistent interpretations); Williams, Re-
strictions on the Use of Land: Conditions Subsequent and Determinable Fees, 27 TEXAS L. REV. 158,
164 (1948) (noting confusion over future interest distinctions in Texas appellate courts).
3. See, e.g., Pritchett v. Turner, 437 So. 2d 104, 109 (Ala. 1983); Oak's Oil Serv. v. Massachu-
setts Bay Transp. Auth., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 593, 598 n.10, 447 N.E.2d 27, 30 n.10 (1983); Chaffin,
supra note 2, at 320-21; White, supra note 2, at 562-73.
4. The term "defeasible fee" is borrowed from the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 16 (1936).
5. As a technical matter, the term "condition" only refers to the restriction in a fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent. See id. § 24. A fee simple determinable is limited by a "special
limitation," see id. § 23, while a fee ,imple subject to an executory limitation is restricted by an
"executory limitation," see id. § 25. All three limitations are triggered by the occurrence of an event
stated by the conveyor.
6. See, e.g., C. Berger, Some Reflections on a Unified Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1323, 1337 (1982) [hereinafter Berger, Reflections]; Browder, Running Covenants and Public Policy,
77 MicH. L. REV. 12, 12-13 (1978); Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servi-
tudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1358-68 (1982); French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes:
Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1304-19 (1982); McDougal, Land-Use
Planning by Private Volition: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4-7
(1974); Newman & Losey, Covenants Running with the Land, and Equitable Servitudes; Two Con-
cepts, or One?, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1319, 1344-45 (1970); Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1227-60 (1982); Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some
Comments on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403, 1409-16 (1982); Sturley,
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This Article argues for a further unification of private land use allo-
cation devices. Specifically, the law should integrate defeasible fees in-
volving land use controls and servitudes. 7 These interests serve the same
purpose: they create rights and corresponding restrictions related to the
use of land. 8 The tensions between freedom of contract rights and the
policy disfavoring restrictions on land inhere in both interests. The con-
fusion in cases involving recently created defeasible fees,9 the forthcom-
ing Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes),10  and current
scholarship examining the relationship between economic efficiency and
rules governing consensual agreements11 underscore the need for integra-
tion. Logic, fairness, and the need to further land use policy goals compel
an integration.
The "Land Obligation" An English Proposalfor Reform, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1417, 1445-47 (1982).
But see L. Berger, Integration of the Law of Easements, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes, 43
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337, 368 (1986) [hereinafter Berger, Integration] (describing "impediments in
the way of a meaningful integration," including different rules of creation and applicability of verti-
cal privity concept); Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude
Restrictions, 70 IowA L. REV. 615, 660-61 (1985) (discussing the need for servitudes reform and
arguing that the elimination of current restrictions in favor of freedom of contract is not a sensible
solution). See generally Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the
Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 433, 436-37, 450 (1984)
(discussing conservation servitudes in the context of the unification of general servitudes). The
American Law Institute currently is exploring an integration of these interests. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) (Prelim. Draft No. 3, 1987).
7. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the law of defeasible fees offers the more valuable model
for unification on certain key issues. See infra Part IV. Most of the cases discussed in this Article
deal with fees on condition involving land use controls. Few reported cases discuss fees on executory
limitation that create land use controls, and those that do involve gratuitous transfers. See Oak's Oil
Serv. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 593, 598 n.9, 447 N.E.2d 27, 30 n.9
(1983); Jost, supra note 2, at 710. The theoretical and policy framework set out herein, nevertheless,
is applicable to all types of defeasible fees allocating land use rights.
8. This Article focuses on conditions related to land use, as opposed to conditions controlling
personal conduct such as marriage, childbearing, or matriculation.
9. See Falls City v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 453 F.2d 771, 772 (8th Cir. 1971) (1971 condition
requiring completion of improvements); Union County v. Union County Fair Ass'n, 276 Ark. 132,
134, 633 S.W.2d 17, 19 (1982) (1961 condition requiring holding of a fair); Lincoln v. Narom Dev.
Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 619, 623, 89 Cal. Rptr. 128, 131 (1970) (1959 condition requiring erection of a
building); Girard v. Miller, 214 Cal. App. 2d 266, 271, 29 Cal. Rptr. 359, 362 (1963) (1958 condition
limiting tree removal and types of building); Nielsen v. Woods, 687 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984) (1978 condition requiring buyer to refinance the property conveyed); City of Idaho Springs v.
Golden Say. & Loan Ass'n, 29 Colo. App. 119, 123, 480 P.2d 847, 849 (1970) (1955 condition
limiting use of conveyed property to operation of a swimming pool); Genet v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
150 So. 2d 272, 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (1957 condition requiring building of a warehouse), cert.
denied, 155 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1963); Kaczynski v. Lindahl, 5 Mich. App. 377, 379, 146 N.W.2d 675,
676 (1966) (deed between 1951-1960 with condition barring sale of alcohol); Rourk v. Brunswick
County, 46 N.C. App. 795, 798, 266 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1980) (1957 condition requiring building of a
health center); County of Abbeville v. Knox, 267 S.C. 38, 39, 225 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1976) (1965
condition requiring erection of a building); Forsgren v. Sollie, 659 P.2d 1068, 1068 (Utah 1983)
(1960 condition restricting use of conveyed property to church or residential purposes).
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) (Prelim. Draft No. 3, 1987).
11. See, eg, Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 711-19 (1973).
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Part II of this Article reviews the foundation supporting integration
and focuses on servitudes and conditions as functional equivalents.
Shared attributes of the interests are examined-the contract and an-
tirestrictions policy dichotomy, remedies, "in gross" interests, permissi-
ble subject matter, and termination and modification. Part III evaluates
the advantages and disadvantages of unification, concludes that unifica-
tion is desirable, and proposes legislative and judicial approaches to
achieve integration. These observations are important to courts and leg-
islatures both for the interpretation of interests under the current frac-
tionalized system and for the implementation of an integrated law. This
Article's inquiry into the desirability of unification also reveals the criti-
cal issues raised by a merged law of defeasible fees and servitudes and in
Part IV suggests how to resolve them.
II. The Foundation for Unification
A. Servitudes and Conditions as Functional Equivalents
A condition imposed in a defeasible estate and a servitude limiting a
fee are methods for transferring from the fee owner to another person a
nonpossessory ownership interest in the land burdened by the servitude
or condition. 12 This ownership interest can be a negative restriction con-
trolling activities on the burdened parcel, or an affirmative right requir-
ing the servient owner to perform an act or tolerate an intrusion on her
fee. Numerous nonpossessory ownership rights have substantively
equivalent prohibitions or entitlements, and they differ only in the form
chosen to memorialize the transaction. Landowners employ both condi-
tions and servitudes to create negative restrictions on permissible uses of
property, 13 type and quality of construction, 14 manufacture or sale of
12. See Reichman, supra note 6, at 1231.
13. See, eg., Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 744, 254 P. 1101, 1101 (1927) (real covenant;
residential purposes); Springmeyer v. City of S. Lake Tahoe, 132 Cal. App. 3d 375, 378, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 43, 44 (1982) (fee on condition; governmental purposes); Jones v. Burns, 221 Miss. 833, 844,
74 So. 2d 866, 869 (1954) (executory limitation; school uses; void under Rule Against Perpetuities);
Shipton v. Sheridan, 531 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (same); Rick v. West, 34 Misc. 2d
1002, 1003, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195, 196 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (real covenant; residential purposes); Murray v.
Trustees of the Lane Seminary, 1 Ohio Op. 2d 236, 237, 140 N.E.2d 577, 579 (C.P. 1956) (fee on
condition; residential purposes); City of Klamath Falls v. Bell, 7 Or. App. 330, 334, 490 P.2d 515,
517 (1971) (executory limitation; library purposes; void under Rule Against Perpetuities).
14. See, eg., Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 258, 116 P. 729, 730 (1911) (fee on condition;
private residence and minimum value): Shields v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 225 Cal.
App. 2d 330, 332, 37 Cal. Rptr. 360, 362 (1964) (fee on condition; single-family dwelling); Snow v.
Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 479-80, 197 N.E. 224, 225 (1935) (real covenant; single-family dwelling
and minimum value).
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alcohol, 15 and competing business activities, 16 as well as to improve af-
firmative obligations such as a requirement to seek approval from an ar-
chitectural committee before building 17 or to maintain or build certain
structures on the land.18 The remedies available for breach of condition
and servitude differ theoretically,' 9 but the two vehicles are simply alter-
native ways to accomplish the same allocation of rights in land. That a
third party holds the enforcement right with a fee simple subject to an
executory limitation does not distinguish the interest from other land
rights allocation devices; rather, it is similar to a servitude enforced,
under third-party beneficiary theory, by a party other than the cove-
nantee.20 The condition and the servitude are essentially functional
equivalents.
Traditionally, classification as a defeasible fee or a servitude depends
on the language chosen by the parties.2 ' Defeasible estates arise when
words of conveyance limit the fee and provide for automatic expiration in
favor of the grantor on the occurrence of a stated condition,22 for a
power of termination or right of entry in the grantor upon breach of a
15. See, e.g., El Di, Inc. v. Town of Bethany Beach, 477 A.2d 1066, 1067 (Del. 1984) (real
covenant); Kaczynski v. Lindahl, 5 Mich. App. 377, 379, 146 N.W.2d 675, 676 (1966) (fee on condi-
tion); Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 438, 58 A.2d 89, 92 (Ch.) (real cove-
nant), aff'd, I N.J. 508, 64 A.2d. 347 (1948); Betts v. Snyder, 341 Pa. 465, 467, 19 A.2d 82, 83
(1941) (executory limitation); Benner v. Tacony Athletic Ass'n, 328 Pa. 577, 579, 196 A. 390, 391
(1938) (real covenant); see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 46 illus. 23 (1936) (fee on condition).
16. See, eg., Calumet Council Bldg. Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 167 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.
1948) (fee on condition prohibiting sale of fuels and lubricants); Dick v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 115
Conn. 122, 124, 160 A. 432, 432 (1932) (real covenant promising not to rent to retail or wholesale
furniture businesses); Shell Oil Co. v. Henry Ouellette & Sons Co., 352 Mass. 725, 726 n.2, 227
N.E.2d 509, 510 n.2 (1967) (real covenant promising not to use adjacent property for any purpose
that would compete with any use of the conveyed property); Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Tremper, 75
Mich. 36, 37, 42 N.W. 532, 532 (1889) (fee on condition prohibiting sale of liquor so as to create a
monopoly).
17. See, e.g., Girard v. Miller, 214 Cal. App. 2d 266, 270, 29 Cal. Rptr. 359, 361 (1963) (fee on
condition); cf. McNamee v. Bishop Trust Co., 62 Haw. 397, 400, 616 P.2d 205, 208 (1980) (real
covenant; approval required from managing committee); Jones v. Northwest Real Estate Co., 149
Md. 271, 275, 131 A. 446, 448 (1925) (real covenant; approval required from grantor).
18. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bradley, 23 Conn. Supp. 87, 87, 177 A.2d 227, 228 (Super. Ct. 1961)
(real covenant; maintain a dam and pond); Genet v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 150 So. 2d 272, 273 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.) (fee on condition; build a warehouse), cert. denied, 155 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1963);
McNaughton v. Schaffer, 314 S.W.2d 245, 246 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (real covenant; maintain a
fence); Betts v. Snyder, 341 Pa. 465, 466, 19 A.2d 82, 83 (1941) (executory limitation; maintain farm
buildings); County of Abbeville v. Knox, 267 S.C. 38, 39, 225 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1976) (fee on condi-
tion; build an industrial building).
19. See infra section II(C)(1); infra subpart IV(A).
20. See Roehrs v. Lees, 178 N. J. Super. 399, 405, 429 A.2d 388, 391, (App. Div. 1981); Fey v.
Swick, 308 Pa. Super. 311, 316, 454 A.2d 551, 554 (1982); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 541
(1944).
21. Circumstances are important when the language is unclear. See Second Church of Christ
Scientist v. LePrevost, 67 Ohio App. 101, 105-06, 35 N.E.2d 1015, 1017-18 (1941); RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY § 44 comment m, § 45 comment p (1936).
22. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 44 (1936) (fee simple determinable).
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condition,23 or for an executory limitation in a third party upon occur-
rence of a stated event.24 Real covenants, in contrast, are created by
language of promise and usually appear in bilateral agreements rather
than grants.25
Recognizing different rules and results for servitudes and defeasible
fees, however, is illogical when the only true distinction between them is
language-the imperfect signs chosen to express the parties' intent-and
the parties' underlying understandings are essentially the same.26 Even if
such a distinction were viable theoretically, it would be difficult to apply.
One court demonstrated the confusion by stating that "this covenant
grants a conditional estate, in the nature of a negative easement. '27
Technical differences in language should not prevent a merger of ease-
ments and real covenants, 28 treatment of all fees on condition as func-
tional equivalents, 29 or a rationalization of classical distinctions between
fees on condition and fees ont executory limitation;30 similarly, these dif-
23. Id. § 45 (fee simple subject to a condition subsequent).
24. Id. § 46 (fee simple subject to executory limitation).
25. See id. § 44 comment m, § 45 comments n, p.
26. In Letteau v. Ellis, the court criticized rigid adherence to language distinctions:
We find it needless to follow appellants' arguments on the technical rules and distinctions
made between conditions, covenants, and mere restrictions. In many, if not all, of the cases
dealing with changed conditions, the terms have been used with apparent disregard of the
niceties of differentiation, and the reasons advanced would have application to a resulting
situation, regardless of the means of its creation.
122 Cal. App. 584, 588, 10 P.2d 496, Z-97 (1932); see also Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J.
246, 257, 139 A.2d 291, 297 (1958) ("The ancient land law imputed a thaumaturgic quality to lan-
guage .... ).
27. Duester v. Alvin, 74 Or. 544, 552, 145 P. 660, 663 (1915); see also Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal.
App. 29, 36, 187 P. 159, 162 (1919) ("[T]he conditions in the deeds are reservations in the nature of
easements or servitudes .... ).
28. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPE.TY § 483 comment h (1944); C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS
AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND": INCLUDING LICENSES, EASEMENTS, PROF-
ITS, EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS AND RENTS 5 (2d ed. 1947); 3 R. POWELL & P. ROMAN, POWELL
ON REAL PROPERTY % 407, at 34-37 to -38 (rev. ed. 1987).
29. Courts not only confuse servitudes and defeasible fees, but also confuse the two traditional
categories of fees on condition: the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent and the fee simple
determinable. See, e.g., Calumet Council Bldg. Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 167 F.2d 539, 543 (7th
Cir. 1948) (referring to grantor's retained interest as both a possibility of reverter and a right of
entry); Shields v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 225 Cal. App. 2d 330, 334, 37 Cal. Rptr.
360, 363 (1964) (same); Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., 152 Colo. 162, 167, 381 P.2d 13, 16 (1962)
(finding that a "possibility of reverter" followed a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent);
Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 433, 58 A.2d 89, 95 (Ch. 1948) (same). This
confusion has caused criticism of continued differentiation and a call for unification of the two
interests. See, eg., McDougal, supra note 2, at 1090-92 (demonstrating the weakness of the pur-
ported distinction between the two different types of fees on condition); Waggoner, supra note 2, at
752-53 (calling for abolition of separate interests).
30. Some courts have difficulty distinguishing between fees on condition and fees simple subject
to executory limitation. See, e.g., In r, Pruner's Estate, 400 Pa. 629, 637-38, 162 A.2d 626, 631
(1960) (observing that the interest at isue has been variously called a base or qualified fee, a fee
simple subject to an executory devise, a fee simple defeasible, and a fee simple determinable); see also
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 25 coriment c (1936) (noting that executory interests differ from
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ferences should not bar an integration of the law of servitudes and defea-
sible estates. With technical arguments eliminated, the policies that
underlie both servitudes and conditions may be analyzed to determine
whether their similarity justifies such an integration. Identifying and ex-
ploring the common policy concerns in conditions and servitudes also
will indicate the issues that a unified law must accommodate.
B. The Contract and Antirestrictions Dichotomy
Servitudes and defeasible fees are treated as distinct areas of the law,
even though the interests share the same policy conflict. Two major,
conflicting themes-freedom of contract and a policy disfavoring restric-
tions on land-underlie both the law of servitudes3t and the law of defea-
sible fees and make case resolution difficult.
L Freedom of Contract.-One major strain running through real
covenant cases is the idea that freedom of contract validates these inter-
ests. Real covenants are enforced like other consensual arrangements be-
tween private parties.32 Treating real covenants as contracts supports
values of moral obligation, efficiency, and freedom of choice. Similar
freedom of contract values are inherent in defeasible fees, although they
are obscured by various factors. A major obstacle to recognition of con-
tract values is that defeasible fees are created by deed, a unilateral instru-
ment, rather than by contract, a document of bilateral promises.
conditions subsequent because they cannot operate in favor of the conveyor). Courts especially have
problems determining whether a conveyance providing for a reversion to the land retained creates a
fee simple subject to executory limitation or a fee on condition. See, e.g., Fayette County v. Morton,
282 Ky. 481, 484-85, 138 S.W.2d 953, 955 (1940) (fee on condition); Jones v. Bums, 221 Miss. 833,
841, 74 So. 2d 866, 868 (1954) (executory limitation); Shipton v. Sheridan, 531 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975) (executory limitation); County School Bd. v. Dowell, 190 Va. 676, 686-88, 58 S.E.2d
38, 43 (1950) (fee on condition). Courts also have problems deciding which interest is created by a
reversion mentioning a grantor's heirs. See, e.g., Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Allen, 221 Tenn.
90, 96, 424 S.W.2d 796, 799 (1967) (executory limitation); Williamson v. Grizzard, 215 Tenn. 544,
548-49, 387 S.W.2d 807, 809 (1965) (fee on condition).
31. The tension between these values is most apparent in the real covenants part of servitudes,
but these issues also require attention in connection with easements.
32. See, e.g., Gruble v. MacLaughlin, 286 F. Supp. 24, 31 (D.V.I. 1968) (enforcing restrictive
covenant under freedom of contract doctrine); Benton v. Bush, 644 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1982) ("[R]estrictions, like other contracts, will be enforced according to the clearly expressed inten-
tions of the parties."). Commentators agree that the free will and intent of the parties is an impor-
tant factor in determining outcomes. See, e.g., Berger, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1329
(acknowledging that the "intent of the parties should be given a dominant position in the interpreta-
tion of agreements"); Epstein, supra note 6, at 1358 ("[W]ith notice secured by recordation, freedom
of contract should control."); French, supra note 6, at 1305 ("[L]ike other agreements ... the law
should give effect to the parties' intentions, enforcing the agreement until it becomes obsolete or
unreasonably burdensome."); see also Ellickson, supra note 11, at 713-14 (explaining why covenants
generated by market forces tend to optimize resource allocation and promote efficiency); Reichman,
supra note 6, at 1184 (recognizing that "[t]he practice of allowing free market transactions to allo-
cate user's rights contributes to the overall efficient utilization of land").
539
Texas Law Review
Classical theory shows that an owner of a defeasible fee is not bound by a
promise made respecting the: land; rather, the law limits her ownership
rights because she was granted less than a fee simple absolute. A restrict-
mng agreement is unnecessary because the "bundle of sticks" that the
grantee received did not include the right in question. 33 For the purpose
of analyzing freedom of contract values, however, this Article will treat
defeasible fees as two-party contracts. Indeed, underlying any such uni-
lateral grant is a bilateral agreement between the grantor and grantee in
which the grantee accepts (and presumably pays for) a lesser estate.
Viewed in this manner, a defeasible fee is functionally indistinguishable
from a grant of a fee simple absolute with a corresponding promise by
the grantee to the grantor in the form of a real covenant.3 4 Some courts
are not distracted by the classic distinction and recognize that a fee on
condition involves a bilateral exchange and a contracting process. 35
Easements, like defeasible fees, are memorialized in unilateral deeds, but
it is clear that courts interpret easements as bilateral agreements gov-
erned by the intent of the parties.36
(a) Moral obligation.-Courts imply that conditions and servi-
tudes should be enforced against successors to the original grantee or
covenantor because of a moral obligation rooted in the notion of con-
tract.37 Some courts are concerned about the injustice of allowing a suc-
33. One court explained the right as follows:
By the deed ... the entire and absolute interest in the estate did not pass to the grantee.
The restriction on the use of the premises contained in the deed operated as a qualification
of the fee, and was in the nature of a reservation or exception out of the estate granted.
Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 341, 346 (1863).
In real covenants, the promise is made by the original covenantor, and the running of burdens
analysis links it to future owners.
34. For example, ifa fee owner wanted to place restrictions on certain land she was selling, she
could employ either an indefeasible fee with a real covenant or a defeasible fee to achieve the same
end.
35. See, e.g., Genet v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 150 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (noting
that the grantee freely agreed to the imposition of the condition subsequent), cert. denied, 155 So. 2d
551 (Fla. 1963); Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 257, 139 A.2d 291, 297 (1958) ("The
universal touchstone today is the intention of the parties to the instrument creating the interest in
land."); Murray v. Trustees of the Lane Seminary, 1 Ohio Op. 2d 236, 242, 140 N.E.2d 577, 585
(C.P. 1956) (observing that grantor and grantee "in good faith entered into a contractual
obligation").
36. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY pt. III introductory note at 3149 (1944); C. CLARK,
supra note 28, at 65-91; 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 28, 11 407-408; cf Warner v.
Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 184, 183 P. 945, 949 (1919) (indicating that both grantor's and grantee's
intent are relevant in the construction of all instruments between the parties, including a deed).
37. See Van Sant v. Rose, 260 11. 401, 413, 103 N.E. 194, 198 (1913) (questioning whether
anything could be "much more inequitable or contrary to good conscience" than permitting a party
to profit from selling more rights in land than he purchased); Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock
Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D_2d 950, 951, 344 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31-32 (agreeing with lower
court that evasion of bargained-for obligations "seems immoral"); cf. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 539 comment f (1944) (positing that parties "should be required to live up to their promises" and
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cessor purchaser with notice of a condition to ignore the condition and
contest its enforcement. 38 Decisions also reflect disapproval of a
grantee's attempts to "enlarge his estate" and recover greater considera-
tion by reselling the land free of a condition.39 Although these decisions
use the traditional terminology of unilateral conveyance and limited es-
tates, one court, perhaps unconsciously, underscored the common link
between conditions and servitudes by quoting Tulk v. Moxhay,40 the
leading equitable servitude case, on the issue of moral blameworthiness. 41
(b) Efficiency.-Private agreements allocating nonpossessory
land use rights help to achieve an efficient use of limited land resources.
A party seeking a negative or affirmative right over a parcel of land need
not acquire full title, but can purchase the limited entitlement from the
fee owner. The purchaser does not have to devote the additional re-
sources necessary to acquire a greater interest than she desires. Addi-
tionally, the fee owner can convert a portion of his ownership rights
without having to sell more of the property than he wishes. Both the
parties and society benefit by avoiding a wasteful allocation of resources.
Such efficiency-maximizing transactions are only possible when the law
validates and enforces them without exacting inordinate transaction
costs.
4 2
Servitudes are justified because they encourage the efficient alloca-
tion of land resources. 43 Conditions often achieve the same goal. Courts
hesitate to disturb the economic arrangement of a fee on condition be-
that this principle is one consideration in deciding whether to enforce a covenant). For a discussion
of this notion in the servitudes context, see Korngold, supra note 6, at 450-51.
38. See, eg., Duester v. Alvin, 74 Or. 544, 551, 145 P. 660, 663 (1915) (fee on condition); cf.
Hall v. Hall, 604 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tenn. 1980) (executory limitation; stating that purchasers will be
charged with knowledge of any condition in the deed).
39. See, ag., Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 260-61, 116 P. 729, 731 (1911) (fee on condition);
see also Murray v. Trustees of the Lane Seminary, 1 Ohio Op. 2d 236, 242-43, 140 N.E.2d 577, 585-
86 (C.P. 1956) (fee on condition; noting that nothing could be more inequitable than releasing the
land from the conditions just because it is now adapted to a more valuable use).
40. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
41. Murray, 1 Ohio Op. 2d at 243, 140 N.E.2d at 586 (quoting Heidorn v. Wright, 4 Ohio N.P.
235, 238 (Super. Ct. 1897), and its quoting of Tulk, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1144). The court stated, "Noth-
ing would be more inequitable than the original purchaser should be able to sell the property for a
greater price in consideration of the assignee being allowed to escape from the liability which he had
himself undertaken." Id.
42. See Ellickson, supra note 11, at 713-14 (discussing covenants); Lundberg, Restrictive Cove-
nants and Land Use Control: Private Zoning, 34 MONT. L. REv. 199, 216-17 (1973) (discussing
zoning variances); Reichman, supra note 6, at 1184, 1231, 1234 (discussing servitudes); cf. French,
supra note 6, at 1263 (noting that public regulation often uses private servitudes as tools of
regulation).
43. See Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise Development System,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 39 (1981) (noting that efficiency is often considered the most desirable
objective of a land use allocation system).
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cause of the potential windfall to the fee owner if the condition holder's
interest is not enforced.44 Courts, unfortunately, do not express similar
concern with the possible inefficiencies of the forfeiture remedy, which is
granted for violations of conditions.45
(c) Freedom of choice.-Land use allocation agreements allow
parties to achieve their individual choices and to exert control over a
small part of a large world. Freedom of contract encourages personal
preferences, which become part of the arrangement whether cast as a
condition or servitude. Courts find that the intention of the parties con-
trols, 46 even though "one may disagree with their point of view." 47
Other courts express this deference as the right of property owners to
annex conditions onto property they are conveying. 48 While this phras-
ing obscures the bilateral nature of defeasible fee conveyances, it makes
clear the regard for individual choice.
2. The Antirestrictions Policy.-Real covenants doctrine, while
lauding freedom of contract values, expresses the concern running
throughout real property law over burdensome restrictions on land.49
Some defeasible fee cases also declare the importance of a "public policy
44. See, eg., Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 442-43, 58 A.2d 89, 95 (Ch.
1948); Murray, 1 Ohio Op. 2d at 242-43, 140 N.E.2d at 585-86.
45. See infra section II(C)(1); infra subpart IV(A).
46. See, eg., Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 260-61, 116 P. 729, 731 (1911) (fee on condition);
Genet v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 150 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (same), cert. denied, 155 So.
2d 551 (Fla. 1963); Murray, 1 Ohio Op. at 242, 140 N.E.2d at 585 (same); State ex rel. Dep't. of
Transp. v. Tolke, 36 Or. App. 751, 757-58, 586 P.2d 791, 795 (1978) (same); Hall v. Hall, 604
S.W.2d 851 (Tenn. 1980) (executory limitation); County School Bd. v. Dowell, 190 Va. 676, 686-89,
58 S.E.2d 38, 42-44 (1950) (same). The Rule Against Perpetuities, however, may frustrate the intent
behind an executory limitation. See 2A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
270(6) (rev. ed. 1986).
47. Riverton Country Club, 141 N.J. Eq. at 442, 58 A.2d at 94.
48. See, eg., Jeffries v. State, 212 Ark. 213, 217, 205 S.W.2d 194, 195 (1947) (fee on condition);
Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 463, 251 P. 87, 88 (1926) (fee on condition); Parker v. Nightin-
gale, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 341, 344 (1863) (restrictive covenant); Kaczynski v. Lindahl, 5 Mich. App.
377, 380, 146 N.W.2d 675, 676 (1966) (fee on condition); Duester v. Alvin, 74 Or. 544, 551, 145 P.
660, 663 (1915) (restrictive covenant).
49. See, e.g., Spey v. Hayes, 406 So. 2d 1176, 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("Covenants
restricting the free use of private property must be strictly construed .... "); Caullett v. Stanley
Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 67 N.J. Super. 111, 114-15, 170 A.2d 52, 54 (App. Div. 1961) ("While restric-
tive covenants are to be construed realistically.. . counter considerations, favoring the free transfera-
bility of land, have produced the rule that incursions on the use of property will not be enforced
unless their meaning is clear and free from doubt .... "); Craven County v. First-Citizens Bank &
Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 513-14, 75 S.E.2d 620, 629 (1953) (noting that restrictive covenants are to
be strictly construed because they are in "derogation of the free and unfettered use of land"); Voy-
ager Village Property Owners Ass'n v. .ohnson, 97 Wis. 2d 747, 749, 295 N.W.2d 14, 15 (Ct. App.
1980) ("[R]estrictive covenants are not favored in the law and must be strictly construed in favor of
the free use of land.").
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favoring free alienability of land" 50 or a "free and untrammeled use of
property." 5 1 Yet courts give little explanation to the meaning of these
concepts and fail to indicate their relevance to conditions. This lack of
guidance is worsened by the inconsistency that results from applying the
Rule Against Perpetuities 52 to executory limitations but not to fees on
condition. Courts must recognize that an antirestrictions policy essen-
tially concerns marketability of land and limitation of the dead hand.
(a) Marketability.-Courts and commentators have criticized
defeasible fees and real covenants for hindering the marketability of re-
alty.53 The presence of a condition should not have this effect. Theoreti-
cally, the market in lesser estates should function as smoothly as the
market in fees simple absolute. A buyer, relying on the title system,
could ascertain the ownership interests and discount her offer accord-
ingly. She furthermore might choose to purchase not only the defeasible
fee, but also the right created by the condition; she would thus obtain a
fee simple absolute. Defeasible fees, however, have certain characteris-
tics that create either excessive transaction costs (at the minimum) or an
imperfect market (at the extreme).
Because defeasible fees typically are held in gross,5 4 significant
problems may develop in tracing the many successors in interest who
own fragments of the possibility of reverter, right of entry, or executory
interest.5 5 Even if one is willing to buy out these condition holders, lo-
cating them may be inordinately expensive or even impossible.5 6 The
excessive transaction costs that result from this search do not exist with
50. Peters v. East Penn Township School Dist., 182 Pa. Super 116, 118, 126 A.2d 802, 803
(Super. Ct. 1956) (fee on condition); accord Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69
Mass. (3 Gray) 142, 148 (1855) (executory limitation).
51. In re Conference of Congregational and Christian Churches, 352 Pa. 470, 474, 43 A.2d 1, 3
(1945) (fee on condition). The parties sometimes recognize the problems with restricting land in
perpetuity. See, eg., Lawyers Trust Co. v. City of Houston, 359 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex. 1962) (deed
stated that condition would terminate in 25 years).
52. The Rule is discussed infra notes 62-64.
53. See, ag., Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) at 148-49, 152 (executory limitation); C. CLARK, supra
note 28, at 72-73 (real covenants); Goldstein, supra note 2, at 250-52 (fee on condition); see also W.
BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 337-338 (2d ed. 1954) (discussing re-
straints on alienation and noting that they are generally disfavored by courts as an unreasonable
hindrance on marketability).
54. See, eg., Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 443, 58 A.2d 89, 95 (Ch.
1948); Shields v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 225 Cal. App. 2d 330, 335, 37 Cal. Rptr.
360, 363 (1964); Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 463, 251 P. 87, 88 (1926). In gross ownership
is discussed infra section II(C)(2).
55. See Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82 v. Toscano, 257 Cal. App. 2d 22, 28-29, 64 Cal. Rptr.
816, 820 (1967) (Stone, J., dissenting).
56. See R. WRIGHT & M. GITELMAN, LAND USE 208 n.1 (3d ed. 1982). Actions to quiet title
and curative statutes may provide some help, but neither is a cost free and complete solution.
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appurtenant servitudes because the interest holder must own land contig-
uous to the burdened property.
Because many buyers refuse to purchase a defeasible fee,57 a defeasi-
ble fee owner is left to sell in a limited market or to acquire the holder's
right in order to obtain the fee simple absolute for eventual sale. The
second alternative may creaile a distorted market with the opportunity
for a future interest holder to extract exorbitant payments.5 8 A seller of a
fee subject to a servitude, in contrast, has access to an active market.
Financing difficulties also may hinder transferability. The grantee may
have difficulty in obtaining financing because lenders might avoid trans-
actions in which potential borrowers offer defeasible estates as security.59
Defeasible fees also creat:e marketability problems because of the un-
certainty that results from the need to rely on unrecorded facts to deter-
mine whether a breach of the condition has occurred.60 This difficulty
arises with real covenants as well, but the gravity of the forfeiture remedy
heightens the problem for conditions. Even after a breach has been de-
termined, deciding when the statute of limitations begins to run creates
further difficulties. 61 This issue requires a clear resolution by the legisla-
tures and courts.
(b) The dead hand.-The antirestrictions policy focuses on
dead hand control of land. Servitudes and fees on condition allow per-
petual burdens on land, which have potential negative effects on the bur-
dened landowner and society. In contrast, the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 62 which does not apply to rights of entry, possibilities of
57. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 251.
58. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Narom Dev. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 619, 623, 89 Cal. Rptr. 128, 131
(1970) (requiring completion of the condition or payment of "an acceptable sum"); Alexander v.
Title Ins. & Trust Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 488, 492-93, 119 P.2d 992, 993 (1941) (charging a "substan-
tial consideration," $13,000, from five lot owners to release conditions); Cole v. Colorado Springs
Co., 152 Colo. 162, 165, 381 P.2d 13, 15 (1963) (requesting plaintiff to make various payments for
releases over the years).
59. Lenders hesitate to enter such transactions primarily because of the risk of forfeiture. See
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, para. 737.15a(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (statutory limitation on loans by
life insurance companies secured by mortgages on defeasible fees); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 52 comment a (1936); Goldstein, supra note 2, at 252. Lenders, however, are willing to make loans
secured by mortgages on leasehold estates, even though default by the tenant-mortgagor will termi-
nate the estate and lender's security, when the landlord provides the lender with an opportunity to
cure leasehold defaults or to foreclose for noncurable breaches. See, eg., Jacob Hoffmann Brewing
Co. v. Wuttge, 234 N.Y. 469, 472-73, 138 N.E. 411, 411-12 (1923). Whether similar devices with
limited transaction costs could be developed for defeasible estates remains to be seen.
60. See, e.g., Jost, supra note 2, at 733; Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L.
REv. 389, 450-51; Simes, supra note 2, at 306.
61. See Springmeyer v. City of S. Lake Tahoe, 132 Cal. App. 3d 375, 380 n.3, 183 Cal. Rptr. 43,
45 n.3 (1982).
62. The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities provides that "no interest is good unless it
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
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reverter, or servitudes, 63 voids executory interests that might vest re-
motely and thus prevents an executory limitation from creating an end-
less tie.64
Land restrictions imposed by a prior owner limit the autonomy of
the current landholder. Even though the Rule Against Perpetuities does
not apply to fees on condition and servitudes, its underlying purpose of
preventing perpetual burdens on land, which frustrate the aspirations of
current owners, cannot be ignored. 65 Some courts recognize the
perpetuity danger with fees on condition.66 One court stated that a
"whimsical obsession [and] an expression of testator's vanity" do not
control the grantee.67 Another court, in an action to quiet title by a suc-
cessor to an original grantee, refused to void a condition limiting subdivi-
sion development to residential purposes. Although the court speculated
interest." J. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942). The Rule has been codi-
fied in various forms, see, eg., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.215 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.51 (1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(a) (Anderson 1976), and
recently restated, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.1
(198 1). The Rule has been justified as increasing the alienability of property. See id. pt. I introduc-
tory note; Powell, supra note 2, at 232-33. But see Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand:
Reflections on the Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19 (1977) (arguing
that the Rule increases rather than decreases dead hand control). Regardless of any policy justifica-
tions, the Rule is ingrained in property law. For a further discussion of the Rule, see 3 L. SIMES &
A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1115-1117 (2d ed. 1956).
63. The Rule Against Perpetuities has no application to interests retained by the grantor be-
cause reversions, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry are inherently vested in nature. E.g.,
Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82 v. Toscano, 257 Cal. App. 2d 22, 25 n.3, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816, 818 n.3
(1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.4(b) (1981). The
Rule has never been applied to restrictive covenants and perpetual easements on the grounds that the
social utility of such interests with respect to the use of land usually outweighs the social policy
against the inalienability of property. See 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 28, 670(2), at 60-
69. Courts, however, often apply the Rule Against Perpetuities to void a gift over to the current
owner of the original or neighboring tracts after a fee simple determinable. Because the Rule does
not apply to possibilities of reverter, the opportunity for dead hand control ironically remains in the
heirs of the grantor. See, eg., Fayette County Bd. of Educ. v. Bryan, 263 Ky. 61, 91 S.W.2d 990
(1936); Donehue v. Nilges, 364 Mo. 705, 266 S.W.2d 553 (1954).
64. Because a land use control might last indefinitely, an executory limitation that creates a
land use control must be expressly limited to a maximum duration of 21 years, in addition to any
specified life in being, to survive the Rule. Cf. Blake v. Peters, 46 Eng. Rep. 139, 141 (H.L. 1863)
(finding a restraint upon cutting timber valid as to the first devisee, and implying such limitation
would be invalid as to contingent fee holders in whom the property vests).
65. See 3 L. SiMES & A. SMITH, supra note 62, § 1117, at 13-14; see also Dukeminier, A Modern
Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1907-08 (1986) (advocating the application of the
Rule to all defeasible fees, but in a modified form allowing for a wait-and-see period of 21 years).
66. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Marshall, 136 U.S. 393, 403 (1890) (stating that permanent
restrictions are "a hindrance in the way of what might be necessary for the advantage of the railroad
itself and of the community"); Cast v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Say. Ass'n, 186 Neb.
385, 391, 183 N.W.2d 485, 489 (1971) (holding that condition must be reasonable and must not
affect estate's marketability).
67. Cast, 186 Neb. at 391, 183 N.W.2d at 489 (refusing to enforce a condition subsequent re-
quiring grantee legally to adopt testator's last name because the condition is an indirect restraint on
alienation).
545
Texas Law Review Vol. 66:533, 1988
on whether such conditions violated public policy, it felt constrained by
stare decisis:
There may be strong grounds in public policy against arbitrarily
limiting and restricting the manner of use of real property for in-
definite periods, which may extend far beyond the existing condi-
tions which make such limitations reasonable and justifiable when
created; but our courts have held that such limitations are not
void, as against public policy .... 68
Dead hand control also negatively affects society because land sub-
ject to historical ties cannct readily meet society's current needs. 69
Moreover, unbending enforcement of restrictions on land leads to frus-
tration of other important policies, such as encouraging private subdivi-
sion arrangements, 70 democratic self-determination, 71 and flexibility in
private land use controls.72
3. Striking a Balance.--Express references to the antirestrictions
policy appear less frequently in cases involving fees on condition than in
those involving real covenants. The reason for this difference is unclear.
Perhaps the more intractable historical roots of fees on condition make
them less subject to challenge. 73 Yet the courts' decisions do acknowl-
edge the importance of the antirestrictions policy for fees on condition.74
68. Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 36, 187 P. 159, 162 (1919). For additional facts relating
to this case, see Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cal. App. 530, 531, 258 P. 60, 61 (1927).
69. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Marshall, 136 U.S. 393, 403 (1890).
70. See, e.g., Beverly Island Ass'n v. Zinger, 113 Mich. App. 322, 325, 317 N.W.2d 611, 612
(1982) (stating that subdivision building and use restrictions are favored by public policy); Davis v.
Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1981) (noting that restrictive covenants enhance the value of subdi-
vision property by protecting homeowners from adjacent construction that would impair land val-
ues). One court frustrated this policy when it held that a fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent was enforceable only by the grantor and not by a homeowners association. Girard v.
Miller, 214 Cal. App. 2d 266, 271, 29 Cal. Rptr. 359, 361-62 (1963). Frustration also occurs when a'
court finds a breach and allows reversion of title to the grantor, because the condition no longer can
be enforced against the grantor by neighbors in the subdivision. Jost, supra note 2, at 732; Melli,
supra note 60, at 450-51.
71. See Korngold, supra note 6, at 459, 468-69.
72. See id. at 461-63.
73. Determinable fees date from at least the thirteenth century, see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 1.10 (A. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAW], while courts have recognized
equitable servitudes only since Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
74. Courts exhibit ambivalence about the antirestrictions policy in cases involving interpreta-
tion of a condition's duration. When no time limit is specified, some courts have held that negative
restrictions must be fulfilled for only a reasonable time. See, e.g., Independent Congregational Soc'y
v. Davenport, 381 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Me. 1978); Forsgren v. Sollie, 659 P.2d 1068, 1069 (Utah 1983).
Other courts have stated that affirmative conditions requiring permanent maintenance of a building
do not require that the building remain in perpetuity. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Marshall, 136
U.S. 393, 403 (1890); Mead v. Ballard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 290, 294-95 (1868); Southwestern Presbyte-
rian Univ. v. Clarksville, 149 Tenn. 256, 266-67, 259 S.W. 550, 553 (1923). Still other courts have
reached contrary conclusions, apparently favoring freedom of contract values over the value of free
transferability. See, e.g., Indianapolis, P. & C. Ry. v. Hood, 66 Ind. 580, 584 (1879) (finding breach
of condition that required permanent location when depot was abandoned after 17 years); Riverton
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Although judicial concern over forfeiture and emphasis on strict con-
struction focuses on remedies,75 it may also demonstrate an unease with
the desirability of the restriction itself.
Regardless of most courts' failure to focus on the issues, the an-
tirestrictions policy is relevant and important for both conditions and
servitudes. Free alienability considerations must be balanced against
freedom of contract values when crafting rules of law. Public policy
must at times prevail over consensual agreements. 76
The Rule Against Perpetuities, employed by courts to void execu-
tory limitations, fails to provide an adequate response to the freedom of
contract and antirestrictions dichotomy. The Rule does provide a rough
accommodation by limiting the duration of executory limitations.77 This
helps to minimize the number of potential transferees of such rights,
which reduces the transaction costs of tracing them. Moreover, the Rule
limits dead hand control to a fixed time period. As discussed in Part IV,
however, the Rule is ultimately an unsatisfactory solution because on the
one hand, it does not adequately address some important antirestrictions
issues, and on the other hand, it undermines freedom of contract values
by unnecessarily frustrating the parties' intent.
Accommodating both values and striking a balance between the
conflicting policies are most difficult when enforcement of the land use
restriction is sought against a successor to the original grantee (as in the
case of conditions) or covenantor (as in the case of real covenants). Un-
like the original burdened party, successors have made no express prom-
ise nor accepted the condition.78  Moreover, the passage of time often
Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 442, 58 A.2d 89, 94 (Ch. 1948) (finding that the grantor
"intended its prohibition to extend indefinitely into the future").
In the unusual case of Forsgren v. Sollie, 659 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1983), property was conveyed
subject to the condition that the grantee would build a fence along the boundary before beginning
any other construction. The court found that the grantee was required to build a fence within a
reasonable time; failing that, the grantor had a right to terminate the estate. Id. at 1071. The deci-
sion is odd because it converts a negative restriction (not to build any buildings unless a fence is built
first) into an affirmative duty (build a fence regardless of other buildings) and forces a forfeiture in
the name of the antirestrictions policy.
75. See infra subsection II(C)(1)(a).
76. See, eg., Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 587-88, 10 P.2d 496, 497-98 (1932) (finding
that the public policy against restrictions based on race overrode the parties' agreement); Riste v.
Eastern Wash. Bible Camp, Inc., 25 Wash. App. 299, 301, 605 P.2d 1294, 1295 (1980) (relying on
the rule against direct restraints on alienation to invalidate a restriction on public policy grounds).
77. See supra note 64. Similarly, the common-law rules against transfer of reversionary inter-
ests, see L. SiMEs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 31, at 67-68 (2d ed. 1966),
which have been abrogated by many courts, might be justified today as a blunt check on the prolifer-
ation of restrictions on land. For decisions repudiating the common-law rules against transfer, see
Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 444-45, 58 A.2d 89, 95-96 (Ch. 1948); State ex
rel. Dep't ofTransp. v. Tolke, 36 Or. App. 751, 761-66, 586 P.2d 791, 797-800 (1978); Copenhaver v.
Pendleton, 155 Va. 463, 489, 155 S.E. 802, 812 (1930).
78. Generally, freedom of contract considerations justify enforcing the rights agreed to by the
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exacerbates the difficulties with ties on land.79 Much of the law of real
covenants developed to leap the theoretical hurdle of enforcing an agree-
ment against a person who never made a promise.80 Similarly, courts
dealing with defeasible fees justify binding a successor owner on the basis
that she has notice and accepts the condition when she acquires the lesser
estate.8
1
C. Common Issues
Servitudes and defeasible fees, in addition to sharing the freedom of
contract and antirestrictions conflict, raise similar issues as to the permis-
sible extent of private land use agreements. These issues include reme-
dies, "in gross" interests, the subject matter of land restrictions and
rights, and termination and modification doctrines. The wooden catego-
ries separating the law of servitudes and conditions, however, often trans-
late into different resolutions for the same problem. Moreover, courts
rarely address these issues when dealing with executory limitations. Per-
haps this is due to the comparatively few executory limitation cases in-
volving land use controls;82 more likely, it is because of an unarticulated
and incorrect belief that the Rule Against Perpetuities adequately re-
solves these problems.
This subpart examines the treatment of these common issues under
current law and demonstrates how the contracts and antirestrictions pol-
icy dichotomy underlies them. Part IV shows how a unified law would
resolve these issues.
L Remedies: The Forfeiture Problem.-The key difference be-
tween defeasible fees and servitudes is the remedy available for breach of
the land use right. Violation of a defeasible fee's condition results in for-
feiture of the estate to either the grantor or a third party, while courts
can enforce servitudes only by injunctions or damages. 83 This contrast
original parties to the servitude or defesible fee. See Whitney v. Union Ry., 77 Mass. (11 Gray)
359, 363 (1858).
79. Over time, the restriction may become less meaningful and more frustrating in light of
changed conditions in surrounding land and new societal demands.
80. See Newman & Losey, supra note 6, at 1323 (stating that the privity of estate requirement
was an attempt by the law to justify binding nonconsenting parties). The Restatement of Property
also recognized the difficulty and provided separate chapters for enforcement between original par-
ties and enforcement between successors. RESTATEMENT Of PROPERTY chs. 44, 45 (1944); id. pt.
III scope note.
81. See, e.g., Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 464, 251 P. 87, 88 (1926); Riverton Country
Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 445, 58 A.2d 89, 96 (Ch. 1948).
82. E.g., Oak's Oil Serv. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 593, 598 n.9,
447 N.E.2d 27, 30 n.9 (1983); Jost, supra note 2, at 710.
83. Forfeiture in favor of the grantor occurs with fees on condition. The forfeiture occurs
automatically with a fee simple determinable, whereas forfeiture must be enforced affirmatively by
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raises questions about the desirability and enforceability of consensual
arrangements regarding remedies.
(a) The attitude of the courts.-The forfeiture remedy troubles
the courts in fee on condition cases. To avoid forfeiture,84 courts declare
that whenever possible they will construe an interest as a real covenant
rather than a fee on condition. 85 Additionally, the courts use various
interpretive devices to prevent forfeiture with fees on condition. They
construe such conditions strictly against the party trying to enforce
them,86 require language showing a clear intention to allow forfeiture,87
narrowly construe the language and the facts to determine if the event
triggering the condition has occurred,88 recognize situations that consti-
tute a waiver of the condition, 9 and insist on an intentional, not acciden-
tal, violation of the condition before allowing forfeiture. 90
the grantor or his successors with a fee simple subject to condition subsequent. See Donehue v.
Nilges, 364 Mo. 705, 709, 266 S.W.2d 553, 554-55 (1954); Emrick v. Bethlehem Township, 506 Pa.
372, 379, 485 A.2d 736, 739 (1984). Forfeiture in favor of a third party occurs with executory
limitations.
84. Courts prefer to construe a grant as a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent rather
than a fee simple determinable because the latter's automatic forfeiture remedy theoretically pre-
vents the use of equitable powers to avert the loss of property. See, e.g., Mountain Brow Lodge No.
82 v. Toscano, 257 Cal. App. 2d 22, 25 n.2, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816, 818 n.2 (1967); Nielsen v. Woods, 687
P.2d 486, 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Hagaman v. Board of Educ., 117 N.J. Super. 446, 453-54, 285
A.2d 63, 67 (1971); Lawyers Trust Co. v. City of Houston, 359 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex. 1972); RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 45 comment m (1936).
85. E.g., Humphrey v. C.G. Jung Educ. Center, 714 F.2d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 1983); Oak's Oil
Serv. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 593, 601, 447 N.E.2d 27, 32 (1983);
DeBlois v. Crosley Bldg. Corp., 117 N.H. 626, 629, 376 A.2d 143, 145 (1977); Hagaman, 117 N.J.
Super. at 453-54, 285 A.2d at 67; Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 440, 58 A.2d
89, 93 (Ch. 1948).
86. See, eg., Riverton Country Club, 141 N.J. Eq. at 440, 58 A.2d at 93; Forsgren v. Sollie, 659
P.2d 1068, 1071 (Utah 1983) (Howe, J., dissenting).
87. See, eg., Springmeyer v. City of S. Lake Tahoe, 132 Cal. App. 3d 375, 380, 183 Cal. Rptr.
43, 46 (1982); State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. LoBue, 83 Nev. 221, 223, 427 P.2d 639, 640 (1967),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
88. See, e.g., Springmeyer, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 381, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 46; Kelley v. City of
Lakewood, 644 P.2d 103, 105 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Regular Predestinarian Baptist Church v.
Parker, 373 Ill. 607, 612-14, 27 N.E.2d 522, 523 (1940); Clark v. City of Grand Rapids, 334 Mich.
646, 656-57, 55 N.W.2d 137, 142 (1952). But see Genet v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 150 So. 2d 272, 274
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (construing an interest as a condition rather than an option, and upholding
forfeiture even though an equally plausible interpretation would not have worked a forfeiture), cert.
denied, 155 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1963).
89. See, eg., Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 554, 588, 10 P.2d 496, 497 (1932) (recognizing
implied waiver of a racial restriction because surrounding lots were owned by blacks); Cole v. Colo-
rado Springs Co., 152 Colo. 162, 167-69, 381 P.2d 13, 16-17 (1963) (finding that selling of un-
restricted lots, not asserting the right of reverter upon breach, and granting releases constituted
waiver of condition); Lawyers Trust Co. v. City of Houston, 359 S.W.2d 887, 891 (Tex. 1962) (al-
lowing waiver of condition because of a seven-year hiatus between breach of condition and claim for
reversion).
90. See, e.g., Kinney v. State, 238 Kan. 375, 382, 710 P.2d 1290, 1296 (1985); McArdle v.
School Dist., 179 Neb. 122, 125, 136 N.W.2d 422, 427 (1965).
Some courts adjudicating an action to quiet title have implied that the action does not involve a
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In executory limitation eases, on the other hand, courts show little
concern over the termination of the grantee's interest and rarely use lim-
iting constructional devices to prevent forfeiture. 91 Several factors may
account for this indifference in particular cases: the forfeiture is not in
favor of the grantor,92 the forfeiture is asserted against the original
grantee, 93 the case involves a gratuitous transfer and thus the grantee
loses no consideration, or the Rule Against Perpetuities voids so many
executory interests that forfeiture becomes a moot issue.94 Nevertheless,
forfeiture is a concern to at least some courts dealing with fees on execu-
tory limitation,95 and others should recognize its importance as well.
(b) The problems with forfeiture.-Courts do not adequately
explain the problems with forfeiture and usually resort to maxims to jus-
tify their predisposition against it. A number of courts have explained
that conditions are not favored because they "tend to destroy estates."'96
forfeiture remedy. See, e.g., Calumet Council Bldg. Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 167 F.2d 539, 543
(7th Cir. 1948); Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 36-37, 187 P. 159, 162 (1919); Riverton Country
Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 44647, 58 A.2d 89, 97 (Ch. 1948). But see Jeffries v. State, 212
Ark. 213, 220-21, 205 S.W.2d 194, 197 (1947) (permitting forfeiture in quiet title action); Anderson
v. Jackson County Bd. of Educ., 76 N.C. App. 440, 445-46, 333 S.E.2d 533, 536-37 (1985) (same).
91. Interestingly, the Restatement cfProperty does not provide the same constructional devices
to limit fees simple subject to executory limitation that it does to limit the finding and effect of fees
on condition. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 44 comments m, n, § 45 comments i, 1-p (1936).
92. When property reverts to the original grantor, the loss may be especially bitter to the
divested grantee. Although the purchase price theoretically was discounted by the condition, many
people have a negative intuitive reaction to the original grantor getting the consideration and land,
and the grantee retaining nothing. CourTs may feel more comfortable using their enforcement power
when a third party receives the land, and the grantor does not end up with what many perceive as a
double recovery.
93. Cf Whitney v. Union Ry., 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 359, 364 (1858) (stating that rights to which
original parties agree deserve enforcement).
94. When courts void an executory interest under the Rule Against Perpetuities, the forfeiture
right held by the third party disappears. See 5A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 28, 790. If
the court holds that the present interest was a fee simple on a condition subsequent, the voiding of
the future interest will convert the present interest into a fee simple absolute. See Proprietors of the
Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 142, 156 (1855). If, in the presence of clear
language, the present interest is deemed to be a fee simple determinable, the forfeiture right is pre-
served for the grantor. See Institution for Saving v. Roxbury Home for Aged Women & Others, 244
Mass. 583, 587, 139 N.E. 301, 303 (1923).
95. See, e.g., Pritchett v. Turner, 437 So. 2d 104, 110 (Ala. 1983) (noting that a vague condition
should not result in forfeiture).
96. See, e.g., Springmeyer v. City of S. Lake Tahoe, 132 Cal. App. 3d 375, 380, 183 Cal. Rptr.
43, 46 (1982); Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., 152 Colo. 162, 167, 381 P.2d 13, 16 (1963); Barrie v.
Smith, 47 Mich. 130, 130, 10 N.W. 168, 168 (1881); Gange v. Hayes, 193 Or. 51, 61, 237 P. 2d 196,
200 (1951); Martin v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 205 Va. 942, 947, 140 S.E.2d 673, 677
(1965); see also 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *129 (offering an early articulation
of this view). But see Calumet Council Bldg. Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 167 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir.
1948) ("However, 'if the intention ... is clear and the restrictions are not opposed to a settled rule of
law or public policy, courts will give effect to them.'" (quoting Dunne v. Minsor, 312 Ill. 333, 340,
140 N.E. 842, 844 (1924))).
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Others have declared that "the law does not favor forfeiture. ' 97 These
statements do little to illuminate the forfeiture issue. This concern over
forfeiture in fees on condition contrasts sharply with real covenants,
which are routinely enforced even though the fee's value is reduced to a
very small percentage of its unencumbered value.98 Is this concern over
forfeiture another example of the traditional Anglo-American view that
ownership of land is highly regarded for its mystical, rather than eco-
nomic, value? What justifies the supervention of the remedy to which
the parties agreed?
To understand the place of the forfeiture remedy in a unified law of
conditions and servitudes, one must first examine the real difficulties
with forfeiture. By nature, forfeiture is drastic because it allows a rem-
edy that is in most cases grossly disproportionate to the breach. While it
is true that the parties agreed to it, the courts appropriately should hesi-
tate to enforce forfeiture if fundamental fairness is at stake. 99
Another major negative effect of the forfeiture remedy is underu-
tilization of land. Defeasible fee owners may not fully use the land for
fear of losing the land, the value of their improvements, and any market
97. See, ag., Board of Comm'rs v. Russell, 174 F.2d 778, 781 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 338 U.S.
820 (1949); Springmeyer, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 380, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 46; Atkins v. Anderson, 139 Cal.
App. 918, 920, 294 P.2d 727, 729 (1956); Forsgren v. Sollie, 659 P.2d 1068, 1069 (Utah 1983).
98. See, ag., Sax, Buying Scenery: Land Acquisitions for the National Park Service, 1980 DUKE
L.J. 709, 725-26 (describing loss of fee value due to imposition of real covenant). The relative hard-
ship doctrine alleviates some of the disproportionate hardship resulting from enforcement of real
covenants. See infra note 137.
99. Chancellor Kent recognized that "in many cases [forfeiture is] hardly reconcilable with
conscience." 4 J. KENT, supra note 96, at *129; see also Springmeyer, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 380, 183
Cal. Rptr. at 45 ("[Reversion's] all or nothing character has an inherent potential for working ineq-
uity since it provides no occasion for comparison of the severity of the remedy with the gravity of the
breach."); Richter v. Distelhurst, 116 A.D. 269, 273, 101 N.Y.S. 634, 637 (1906) (holding a condi-
tion restricting grantee from erecting any buildings of a certain class invalid because forfeiture is not
justified when the condition is inserted by the executors or trustees to protect their own property
rather than the property of the grantor).
Theoretically, the grantor receives no windfall when forfeiture leaves him with both the land
and the consideration originally paid by the grantee. According to contract paradigm, this results
because the parties knew or should have known the economic ramifications of their choice of condi-
tion and adjusted their bargain accordingly. Courts might still object to this economic result out of a
belief that, despite contract theory, not all parties fully appreciate the effect of forfeiture. Cf Mead
v. Ballard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 290, 295 (1868) (construing the intent of a condition subsequent provid-
ing for a "permanent" building on the property satisfied if the condition was fulfilled within a year
from conveyance); Board of Comm'rs v. Russell, 174 F.2d 778, 781 (10th Cir.) (stating that forfei-
ture provisions will be strictly construed and will be denied unless the language of the parties is
clear), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 820 (1949); Nielsen v. Woods, 687 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)
(declining to enforce a forfeiture when the party seeking it can otherwise be made whole); Genet v.
Florida E. Coast Ry., 150 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (enforcing condition subsequent
provision on a grantee who freely agreed to the condition but failed to meet it), cert. denied, 155 So.
2d 551 (Fla. 1963); County of Abbeville v. Knox, 267 S.C. 38, 225 S.E.2d 863 (1976) (holding that a
complete and absolute estate created in a granting clause cannot be diminished by subsequent provi-
sions in the deed).
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appreciation through forfeiture, l°° which may result from an inadvertent
violation, unrelated to the legitimate use of the property. Landowners
who are uncertain whether a specific act constitutes a violation of the
condition will be especially reluctant to go forward with the act. Even
when the condition is only slightly ambiguous, the landowner might un-
derutilize the land given the enormity of the loss if she subsequently is
proved wrong. Landowners will not act efficiently or freely when the
specter of forfeiture haunts them;l°' this results in personal and societal
detriment. Real covenants do not create this potential for underutiliza-
tion because upon breach the owner faces either an injunction ordering
cessation of the prohibited activities or monetary damages, neither of
which is as cataclysmic as fbrfeiture of the land. The antirestrictions
policy focuses on inefficient and unfair land ties and mandates mitigation
of the forfeiture remedy.
2. Ties Among Neighbors: The "'In Gross" Issue.-Parties may
wish to create a servitude or condition "in gross," in which the interest
holder does not own any land benefited by the restriction and holds the
right without respect to any other land owned by her.10 2 This interest
contrasts with an "appurtenant" right or restriction that benefits nearby
land held by the interest holder.10 3 Enforcement of in gross land use
rights permits a person removed from an area to control, by exercising a
veto power or requiring affmnative acts, a potentially unlimited amount
of land and landowners. This potential raises antirestrictions problems
not present with appurtenant interests. Both the law of servitudes and
fees on condition have struggled with the in gross ownership issue. Cases
involving executory limitations have yet to focus on the in gross issue;
moreover, the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities sometimes ex-
acerbates the in gross problem by voiding executory interests held by
neighbors to the benefit of reversionary interests owned by successors to
the grantor. ' 4
100. See Melli, supra note 60, at 451; cf Barrie v. Smith, 47 Mich. 130, 133, 10 N.W. 168, 169
(1881) (leaving open the question whether a grantee is statutorily entitled to compensation for im-
provements made on the strength of grantor's seeming acquiescence).
101. Testing the condition in an action to quiet title may be of little help because some courts
will not void conditions in that context, e.g., Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 37, 187 P. 159, 162-
63 (1919), and others show that they treat quiet title actions differently from enforcement cases, see,
e.g., Calumet Council Bldg. Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 167 F.2d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 1948); Riverton
Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 447, 58 A.2d 89, 97 (Ch. 1948).
102. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPEIRTY §§ 453-454 (1944); 2 AMERICAN LAW, supra note 73,
§ 9.32.
103. See 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHA ', supra note 28, 1 620(2).
104. See Fayette County Bd. of Educ. v. Bryan, 263 Ky. 61, 66, 91 S.W.2d 990, 993 (1936);
Donehue v. Nilges, 364 Mo. 705, 711,266 S.W.2d 553, 556 (1954).
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(a) Judicial treatment.-Under classical doctrine, real cove-
nants are not enforceable when the benefit is in gross. 0 5 In contrast, fees
on condition traditionally are created and enforced without an ap-
purtenancy requirement. 06 Despite this, courts reveal an antipathy to-
ward in gross fees on condition. 10 7 Some courts have specifically rejected
enforcement of a possibility of reverter or a right of entry when the gran-
tor or his successor owns no benefited land.108 Some of these courts do
not indicate their reasoning,109 while others rely on contract-based theo-
ries and find inadequate intent to benefit the grantor, 110 lack of consider-
ation,1II or absence of mutuality. 1 12 One court, however, addressed dead
hand control when it denied enforcement of a condition against the suc-
cessor to the original grantee, stating that a grantor may not enforce "as
his fancy may dictate" when the breach "in no way tends to his preju-
dice." 13 Similarly, the rule of construction providing that courts should
construe a restriction as a covenant rather than a condition when the
grantor retains benefited land14 appears to favor appurtenant over in
105. A benefit in gross exists when the holder of the condition, the easement owner, or the
covenantee (real covenants) owns no appurtenant land benefited by the interest so that the interest
only operates to benefit its owner personally, instead of in relation to or appurtenant to any property.
See, e-g., Chandler v. Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 120, 338 P.2d 522, 523 (1959); Orenberg v.
Johnston [Horan], 269 Mass. 312, 315-16, 168 N.E. 794, 795-96 (1929); Minch v. Saymon, 96 N.J.
Super. 464,468, 233 A.2d 385, 387 (1967); Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 A.D. 412,416,45 N.Y.S. 32, 34
(1897).
There are exceptions to the nonenforceability rule. See Korngold, supra note 6, at 473-76.
Easements generally are enforceable when the benefit is in gross. Various commentators suggest that
a unified law of servitudes should follow the model of easements. See Browder, supra note 6, at 43;
Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautification Program, 45 DEN. L.J. 168, 180
(1968); French, supra note 6, at 1307; Reichman, supra note 6, at 1236-37.
106. See, eg., Shields v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 225 Cal. App. 2d 330, 335, 37
Cal. Rptr. 360, 363 (1964); Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459,463, 251 P. 87, 88 (1926); Riverton
Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 443, 58 A.2d 89, 95 (Ch. 1948). In both Riverton
Country Club and Shields at least one of the parties seeking enforcement of the condition did own
benefited land or an easement. Similarly, no doctrine requires that one enforcing an executory limi-
tation must own nearby land.
107. Some parties recognize that in gross conditions create difficulties, and expressly provide in
the deed for the condition to run with the benefited tract. See, eg., Hunt v. Coal Run Homemakers
Club, 440 S.W.2d 267, 267 (Ky. 1969). Their good intentions, however, are often frustrated by
courts that apply the Rule Against Perpetuities to such provisions. See, e.g., Fayette County Bd. of
Educ. v. Bryan, 263 Ky. 61, 66, 91 S.W.2d 990, 993 (1936); Donehue v. Nilges, 364 Mo. 705, 711,
266 S.W.2d 553, 556 (1954).
108. See, eg., Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 260, 116 P. 729, 731 (1911) (possibility of re-
verter); Young v. Cramer, 38 Cal App. 2d 64, 67, 100 P.2d 523, 525 (1940) (possibility of reverter);
Barrie v. Smith, 47 Mich. 130, 134, 10 N.W. 168, 170 (1881) (possibility of reverter); Richter v.
Distelhurst, 116 A.D. 269, 273, 101 N.Y.S. 634, 636 (1906) (right of entry).
109. E.g., Firth, 160 Cal. at 260, 116 P. at 731.
110. E.g., Young, 38 Cal. App. 2d at 69, 100 P.2d at 525.
111. E.g., McArdle v. Hurley, 103 Misc. 540, 543, 172 N.Y.S. 57, 59 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Stevens v.
Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 212 S.W. 639, 645 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, opinion adopted).
112. E.g., Richter v. Distelhurst, 116 A.D. 269, 273, 101 N.Y.S. 634, 636 (1906).
113. Barrie v. Smith, 47 Mich. 130, 133, 10 N.W. 168, 169-70 (1881).
114. See, e.g., Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 36, 187 P. 159, 162 (1919); Post v. Weil, 115
553
Texas Law Review
gross interests.
(b) The threat of in gross interests.-Judicial declarations of an
appurtenancy requirement for fees on condition, when no such require-
ment previously had existed, underscore the dead hand problem with in
gross enforcement of conditions and servitudes. First, given that proper-
ties neighboring a servient tract are limited in number, the practical ef-
fect of the appurtenancy requirement is to minimize the number of
parties that can hold a right over such tracts. 115 Moreover, the ap-
purtenancy requirement restrains an individual's ability to acquire con-
trol over land because of the difficulty and expense of acquiring nearby
land to anchor the servitude. In gross arrangements, in contrast, permit
an unlimited proliferation of ties on land, with the attendant dead hand
problems.
The appurtenancy requirement also promotes flexibility in consen-
sual land use arrangements, which prevents a rigid plan of the past from
frustrating future generations. Neighbors have an incentive to compro-
mise in disputes over land allocation rights because of the desire to main-
tain peaceful relationships and the social norms favoring cooperation
between neighbors. When t:he land use arrangement is reciprocal be-
tween parcels, such as use or building restrictions burdening and benefit-
ing both parcels, the landowners increase their chances for compromise
because both parties stand to gain or lose. This flexibility also makes it
more likely that parties will reach agreements to remove inefficient land
use rights.
Additionally, in gross interests impose an outsider's vision on a
community. In contrast, a. subdivision arrangement with reciprocal
rights and a homeowners association designated to reach compromise
decisions will enhance democratic participation and flexibility and in-
crease self-determination over critical land use decisions affecting the
community. The eccentric desires of an individual must yield to the
community's vision of the common good. 116 The appurtenancy feature,
N.Y. 361, 375, 22 N.E. 145, 148 (1889); Carruthers v. Spaulding, 242 A.D. 412, 414, 275 N.Y.S. 37,
39 (1934).
115. See, e.g., Stegall v. Housing Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 102, 178 S.E.2d 824, 829 (1971) (stating
that a grantor who creates a restrictive covenant cannot enforce it once he has parted with all inter-
est in the land benefited by-the covenant). Some courts go even further and limit the amount of the
surrounding land that can be restricted. See, eg., Rogers v. Zwolak, 12 Del. Ch. 200, 205, 110 A.
674, 676 (1920) (presuming that a building line of 50 feet would be onerous and inequitable but
finding a line of 20 feet to be enforceable); see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 illus. 4
(1944) (stating that construction three blocks away cannot be stopped by grantor).
116. Court decisions support reciprocal subdivision arrangements. See, e.g., Bob Layne Con-
tractor, Inc. v. Buennagel, 158 Ind. App. 43, 53, 301 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1973) (enforcing covenant
that restricted commercial development in a subdivision of single-family homes); Beverly Island
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therefore, limits the reach of the dead hand and removes inefficient land
ties.
3. Subject Matter: Touch and Concern.-Freedom of contract al-
lows parties great discretion to determine the subject matter of servitudes
and conditions, while the antirestrictions policy suggests limitations.
Will courts uphold restrictions on personal conduct against successors,
such as a ban on smoking, or will they limit enforceability to agreements
related to the use and nature of the land itself? The law of conditions
and the law of servitudes provide different answers.
(a) Current doctrine.-Servitudes law traditionally prescribes
the nature of rights and restrictions that landowners can create. The
touch and concern requirement limits the subject matter of real cove-
nants.' 17 Similarly, negative easements usually are restricted to those in-
volving light, air, view, lateral support, and stream flow.11 8 The touch
and concern test has proved elusive and sometimes insurmountable for
generations of law students, attorneys, and judges. Roughly, it allows
enforcement of covenants related to the actual use of the land that aid the
promisee as landowner or hamper the promisor in a similar capacity. 1 9
In contrast, no formal limitations confine permissible conditions,
and courts even allow restrictions on personal conduct. 120 In certain sit-
uations, however, courts refuse to uphold a condition because it threatens
policy imperatives such as free competition' 2' or personal autonomy.1 22
Ass'n v. Zinger, 113 Mich. App. 322, 325, 317 N.W.2d 611, 612 (1982) (stating that building and use
restrictions in residential deeds are favored by public policy); Swaggerty v. Petersen, 280 Or. 739,
744, 572 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1977) (finding that proposed construction was not reasonable because it
was contrary to express provisions of subdivision arrangement). For a discussion of the structuring
of reciprocal subdivision arrangements, see Krasnowiecki, Townhouses with Homes Associations: A
New Perspective, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 711 (1975).
117. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944); Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in
Leases, 12 MICH. L. REV. 639, 645 (1914).
118. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 452 comments a, b (1944); R. CUNNINGHAM; W.
STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.1, at 438-39 (1984); 3 R. POWELL & P.
ROHAN, supra note 28, 405, at 34-20.
119. C. CLARK, supra note 28, at 99. For discussions of the rule, see 2 AMERICAN LAW, supra
note 73, § 9.13 at 378-83; 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 28, 1 673(2)(a). Courts must
analyze the covenant to see if it touches and concerns both the benefit and burden sides of the
covenant. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 990 (3d ed. 1984).
120. See Stewart v. Workman, 85 W. Va. 695, 699, 102 S.E. 474, 475 (1920); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 5.1 (1981).
121. E.g., Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Tremper, 75 Mich. 36, 37, 42 N.W. 532, 532 (1889) (admit-
ting evidence to show that condition was inserted to give grantor a monopoly on the sale of liquor).
122. E.g., Cast v. National Bank of Commerce, 186 Neb. 385, 390, 183 N.W.2d 485, 489 (1971)
(refusing to enforce condition requiring change of name by devisee).
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(b) The need for limits.-Cases revealing a judicial tolerance of
personal conduct restrictions usually involve conditions that apply only
to the initial grantee or conditions enforced by the original grantor
against the original grante. 123 In such cases, freedom of contract
trumps alienability and supports strict enforcement of the condition.
With actions against successors, the antirestrictions policy requires a
more critical approach.
Modem commentators have found merit in the touch and concern
rule. Dean Reichman approves of the touch and concern test because it
promotes efficiency by preventing obligations not related to land use.
Also, by requiring an objective purpose, the test eliminates the possibility
of creating modern variations of feudal serfdom.124 This view contem-
plates a test that imposes external criteria on land use allocation agree-
ments and is, therefore, more than an intent effectuation device. 125
Some support the test because they believe it effectuates the parties'
intent by limiting running covenants to those that the ordinary purchaser
would expect to run with the land.1 26 A buyer can adjust her price ac-
cordingly to reflect the validity or invalidity of the covenant. One prob-
lem with this justification is its circularity: community expectations for
covenants running with the land are derived from prior judicial deci-
sions. Touch and concern, therefore, is not an independent criterion to
effectuate policy goals. Because community expectations are important
in determining the intent of the covenanting parties, it is also unclear
how often the touch and concern concept differs from the requirement
that the parties intend the covenant to run. 127 Moreover, if the parties
expressly provide for the covenant to run, superseding that intent based
on a community expectation touch and concern theory seems anomalous.
123. See, e.g., id. at 392, 183 N.W.2d at 488-89; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DON-
ATIVE TRANSFERS) § 8.2 (1981). But see Hall v. Hall, 604 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tenn. 1980) (conclud-
ing that an executory limitation controlling grantee's remarriage was valid even when held by
transferees of grantee).
124. Reichman, supra note 6, at 1233; Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 139, 150 (1978). But see Epstein, supra note 6, at 1361 (arguing that the touch and concern
test increases transaction costs). The Restatement of Property indicates that "there is a social interest
in the utilization of land" and that "free alienability of land is socially desirable." RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 537 comments a, h (1944,. It does not explain, however, what these ideas mean in the
context of the freedom of contract and antirestrictions policy dichotomy or how the touch and
concern test helps to achieve free alienability or utilization of land.
125. But see Epstein, supra note 6, at 1360 (rejecting the touch and concern test as an intrusion
on the personal choice of the parties); French, supra note 6, at 1308 (preferring modification doc-
trines over the touch and concern test when the burden becomes unreasonable, unfair, or
unconscionable).
126. See, eg., C. CLARK, supra noe 28, at 97; Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting
the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1.57, 208-09, 211-12 (1970); French, supra note 6, at 1289-90;
Krasnowiecki, supra note 116, at 718.
127. See 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 28, 673(2)(b).
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Application of a touch and concern litmus test achieves adequate
policy-oriented results in the majority of cases. For example, a touch
and concern test works well for most appurtenant negative covenants,
because in such cases freedom of contract considerations support land
use allocation agreements and no antirestrictions values supervene. Un-
fortunately, the touch and concern test allows courts to utilize an arcane
framework to avoid articulating and analyzing important policy con-
flicts. Courts address the running of covenants that limit competition,
for example, as an issue of touch and concern. The decisions focus on
whether an effect on the physical use of the land is needed, 128 when they
should analyze directly the monopoly issue. 129
The law of fees on condition provides a valuable lesson on the need
to confront policy issues. Although conditions suffer from the absence of
generalized restrictions on subject matter, courts that do scrutinize prob-
lematic conditions tend to confront the underlying issues and avoid the
touch and concern test jargon. For example, courts expressly evaluate
and decide the validity of fees on condition restraining competition based
on their deleterious monopolistic effects balanced against the desire of
businesses to acquire a protected market position.' 30
4. Termination and Modification
(a) Existing rules.-Obsolete land rights allocation agreements
cause inefficient allocation of land resources.' 3 ' Without judicial inter-
vention, removal of such restrictions may prove impossible or implausi-
ble without excessive transaction costs or "blackmail" payments.132 Real
covenants law partially responds to this problem with the doctrine of
changed conditions. The doctrine denies enforcement of a real covenant
if the conditions affecting the property have changed so significantly that
128. See, e.g., Dick v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 115 Conn. 122, 126, 160 A. 432, 433 (1932) (stating
that anticompetitive covenant restrains use and so touches and concerns the burdened lot); Shell Oil
Co. v. Henry Ouellette & Sons Co., 352 Mass. 725, 730, 227 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1967) (holding that
anticompetitive covenant did not run because it bestowed no direct physical advantage on benefited
parcel).
129. Cf Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 90-99, 102, 390 N.E.2d 243, 246-50,
252 (1979) (discussing the touch and concern, physical use requirement separately from and without
reference to a discussion of the enforceability of covenants restraining competition).
130. See, eg., Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376, 382, 92 P. 1022, 1024 (1907) (holding that a
condition prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors is invalid if inserted for the purpose of creating
a monopoly in favor of the grantor, but might be valid for the purpose of aiding the social and moral
welfare of the community by preventing intemperance); Fusha v. Dacono Townsite Co., 60 Colo.
315, 319, 153 P. 226, 227 (1915) (upholding condition barring sale of liquor, imposed by grantor to
benefit brewery that owned neighboring, unrestricted sites).
131. See French, supra note 6, at 1313; Reichman, supra note 6, at 1233.
132. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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the parties cannot achieve their original intention. 133 Some courts ad-
dressing fees on condition borrow this doctrine to deny enforcement of
obsolete conditions and avoid forfeiture. 134 Related doctrines bar a gran-
tor's enforcement of a condition if there is impossibility of perform-
ance 135 or substantial compliance with the condition.136
(b) Remaining issues.-The traditional termination and modi-
fication rules of servitudes ar.d conditions tend to focus on a dispute be-
tween two individuals. They neglect, 137 and expressly reject at times,138
the public interest in removing certain interests that inefficiently tie up
land. Restrictions in which the public interest is great would include, for
example, a restriction against building in an unused alley that in effect
bars construction of a major complex which would help the town's econ-
133. See Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Ca. 743, 747, 254 P. 1101, 1102-03 (1927); RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 564 (1944); 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 28, 679(2).
134. See, e.g., Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 588, 10 P.2d 496, 497 (1932) (striking racial
restriction); Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., 152 Colo. 162, 168, 381 P.2d 13, 18 (1963) (striking
liquor restriction); McArdle v. School Dist., 179 Neb. 122, 131, 136 N.W.2d 422, 425 (1965) (strik-
ing restriction that land be used for shchl purposes); cf. Shields v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 225 Cal. App. 2d 330, 337, 37 Cal. Rptr. 360, 365 (1964) (recognizing doctrine, but finding no
changed conditions on facts). Changed conditions may be irrelevant, however, to fees on executory
limitation. See, e.g., Williamson v. Grizzard, 215 Tenn. 544, 551-52, 387 S.W.2d 807, 810 (1965)
(finding that despite changed condition,; surrounding the church parsonage, any voluntary attempt
to assign the parsonage would revest title in grantor).
135. See, e.g., Murray v. Trustees of the Lane Seminary, I Ohio Op. 2d 236, 242, 140 N.E.2d
577, 585 (C.P. 1956) (stating that covenant would not be enforced if it was impossible for grantee to
use the property as a private dwelling).
136. See, e.g., Mead v. Ballard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 290, 294-95 (1872) (finding compliance with
condition by constructing institute within time limit, even though building later was destroyed by
fire); Gordy v. Cobb County School Dis:., 255 Ga. 26, 27, 334 S.E.2d 688, 689 (1985) (finding that a
sufficient portion of the land was used for its designated purpose); Independent Congregational
Soc'y v. Davenport, 381 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Me. 1978) (finding substantial compliance when condition
observed for almost 150 years); Johnsox v. City of Hackensack, 200 N.J. Super. 185, 190-91, 491
A.2d 14, 17 (App. Div. 1985) (finding that a minor deviation did not breach the condition).
137. The law of relative hardship in servitudes focuses only on the owners of the burdened and
benefited properties. See, e.g., Lake Wauwanoka, Inc. v. Spain, 622 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981) (holding that a restrictive covenant which causes hardship to the servient estate will be en-
forced only if it still substantially benefits dominant estate); Katzman v. Anderson, 359 Pa. 280, 285,
59 A.2d 85, 87 (1948) (stating that equ ty will not enforce a restriction if changed conditions have
made its continued enforcement of no value to the dominant tenement).
Similarly, courts in fee on condition cases focus on the two parties, rather than upon the greater
public interest. See, e.g., Atkins v. Anderson, 139 Cal. App. 918, 920, 294 P.2d 727, 729 (1956)
(comparing relative burdens of the parties); Nielsen v. Woods, 687 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984) (declining to enforce a right of entry when the party seeking forfeiture can be made whole
otherwise and the other party's breach was not willful or grossly negligent).
138. Some courts expressly reject public concerns. See, ag., Evangelical Lutheran Church of the
Ascension v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 168, 172 N.E. 455, 457 (1930) (rejecting the contention that the
public interest favors the church's existence). But see Blakely v. Gorin, 365 Mass. 590, 599, 313
N.E.2d 903, 909 (1974) (holding that public's interest in tax dollars from hotel outweighed utility of
restrictive covenant); Holmes Harbor Water Co. v. Page, 8 Wash. App. 600, 603, 508 P.2d 628, 630-
31 (1973) (looking to nuisance law for a public interest model for covenants); MASS. GEN. L. ch.
184, § 30(5) (1986) (imposing a public interest standard on the enforceability of all restrictions on
title to real property).
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omy or tax base, 139 or a privately held conservation servitude that pro-
hibits land use required by pressing public need of employment,
transportation, or recreation. 140 Current termination doctrine is ill-
equipped to resolve the contracts and antirestrictions policy conflict in-
herent in such disputes.
III. The Unification Choice
Because servitudes and conditions share the same policy dynamic
and face similar issues of creation and enforcement, the legal rules con-
trolling them should be unified. The benefits, disadvantages, and means
of achieving an integration must be assessed. Moreover, because tradi-
tional treatment of defeasible fees and servitudes is only one example of
the fragmented state of real property law, 41 this examination can be in-
structive in other problem areas.
A. Why Unify?
1. The Case for Merger.-Several considerations support unifica-
tion. First, fairness and reason require that situations with similar facts
and policy concerns receive equal treatment by the law. To achieve this
goal, one must develop a consistent conceptual framework. Similar dis-
position of functionally equivalent land use allocation devices cannot oc-
cur when distinct labels and legal doctrines for servitudes and conditions
prevail. Such distinctions have led to a preoccupation with classifica-
tions that bear little relation to the substance of the transfer and the pol-
icy dynamics. 142 While the common law over time developed these
separate doctrinal boxes, ironically, some early American judges viewed
fees on condition and servitudes as functional equivalents and stated that
results should not depend on "subtle and artificial" distinctions. 143 They
139. See Blakely, 365 Mass. at 599, 313 N.E.2d at 909 (allowing a bridge walkway over an alley
in contravention of a restrictive covenant).
140. See Korngold, supra note 6, at 465-66.
141. Examples of other interests that are functionally equivalent yet treated differently include
an installment sales contract and a conveyance with a purchase money mortgage, licenses and leases,
and a vested remainder subject to divestment and a contingent remainder with a condition
precedent.
142. Courts engage in lengthy discussions to determine the estate. See, e.g., Mountain Brow
Lodge No. 82 v. Toscano, 257 Cal. App. 2d 22, 25 n.2, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816, 818 n.2 (1967); Riverton
Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 440-41, 58 A.2d 89, 93-95 (Ch. 1948). One court noted:
"[I]n traveling through the complicated maze of future-interest concepts, we disagree about the
labeling of the interest." Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 623 (Wyo. 1983).
143. Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 341, 348 (1863) (allowing grantees to enforce
condition against another grantee, and stating that "it is quite immaterial to determine the precise
legal nature or quality of the restriction in question"); see also 4 J. KENT, supra note 96, at *124-25
(noting the lack of technical words to distinguish conditions precedent and subsequent).
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sought decisions grounded in. "good sense and sound equity to the object
and spirit of the contract in the given case."' 44
Second, unifying and clarifying the law of defeasible fees and servi-
tudes benefit parties engaging in land use allocation transfers. The cur-
rent disparate treatment of allocation devices creates confusion for those
wishing to engage in such t:ransactions. Courts treat fees on condition
with great suspicion,1 45 sometimes straining to prevent enforcement by
resorting to various interpretive devices and savings doctrines, and pre-
ferring whenever possible to construe a provision as a real covenant
rather than a fee on condition,' 46 even when the parties apparently in-
tended a fee on condition.' 47 Executory limitations fare no better when
courts apply the Rule Against Perpetuities to trump the parties' inten-
tions and void interests that would be upheld if interpreted as fees on
condition or servitudes. Because of the unpredictable shell game of label-
ing interests, parties can have little confidence that a court will not attach
an unintended label to an interest and trigger an unwanted set of rules
and an unexpected result. An integrated law of servitudes and defeasible
fees would allow parties to transact more securely. While legitimate and
articulated public policy considerations might provide limitations on any
agreement, eliminating the current system of judicial labeling would end
the frustration of drafters' and planners' goals. Integration would maxi-
mize the efficiency of land use allocation devices and could reduce trans-
action costs in the process.
Moreover, when functional equivalents have distinct labels and
rules, the skilled drafter may grasp an opportunity to avoid application of
144. 4 J. KENT, supra note 96, at "132-33.
145. E.g., MacDonald Properties, Inc. v. Bel-Air Country Club, 72 Cal. App. 3d 693, 699, 140
Cal. Rptr. 367, 371 (1977); Gordon v. 'Whittle, 206 Ga. 339, 340, 57 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1950); Caro-
lina & N.W. Ry. v. Carpenter, 165 N.C. 465, 468, 81 S.E. 682, 683 (1914).
146. E.g., Humphrey v. C.G. Jung Educ. Center, 714 F.2d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 1983); Oak's Oil
Serv. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. AtLth., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 593, 601, 447 N.E.2d 27, 32 (1983);
DeBlois v. Crosley Bldg. Corp., 117 N.H. 626, 629, 376 A.2d 143, 145 (1977); Hagaman v. Board of
Educ., 117 N.J. Super. 446, 453-54, 285 A.2d 63, 67 (App. Div. 1971); Riverton Country Club v.
Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 440, 58 A.2d 89, 93 (Ch. 1948).
147. E.g., Second Church of Christ, Scientist v. LePrevost, 67 Ohio App. 101, 104-05, 35 N.E.2d
1015, 1017 (1941) (refusing to find condition subsequent in church's deed even though its language
seemed to create one); W.F. White Land Co. v. Christenson, 14 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1928, no writ) (finding that "what purported to be conditions subsequent in the deed are
merely building restrictions denoting covenants"); Martin v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous.
Auth., 205 Va. 942, 947-48, 140 S.E.2d 673, 677 (1965) ("[C]onditions subsequent are not favored in
the law because they tend to destroy ettates, and when relied on to work a forfeiture they must be
created by express terms or clear implication."). The courts claim they are finding the parties intent
by looking to factors besides language. See, e.g., LePrevost, 67 Ohio App. -at 104-05, 35 N.E.2d at
1017. But see Murray v. Trustees of the Lane Seminary, 1 Ohio Op. 2d 236, 240-41, 140 N.E.2d 577,
582-83 (C.P. 1956) (finding that even though conditions subsequent are not favored, the language in
the grant unequivocally created a condition subsequent).
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a desirable public policy. For example, courts have denied recent at-
tempts to enforce real covenants limiting use of a residence to related
persons against group homes for the mentally ill, 148 because real cove-
nants in violation of public policy traditionally are unenforceable.1 49
Could a court enforce a fee on condition of similar substance, given that
there is no clear parallel body of law in the jurisprudence of conditions?
Should the validity of such a restriction cast as an executory limitation be
tested only by the Rule Against Perpetuities? A court applying a func-
tional equivalents analysis would not answer these questions affirma-
tively, but under current law, that is a possible outcome. To decide
private land use device cases, whether servitude or defeasible fee, by ex-
press reference to the policy concerns and rules of law developed to ac-
commodate them is superior to legal rules that allow landowners to
manipulate the labels in order to avoid these policy decisions.150
2. Concerns About Integration.-Although some arguments
against a merger of servitudes and defeasible fees have merit, they ulti-
mately prove unsatisfactory and should not prevail. Providing parties
with a number of legally valid alternatives so that they may choose the
structure that best achieves their goals is beneficial, but servitudes and
conditions are functional equivalents and actually do not present differ-
ent options for allocating land rights. Forfeiture, a critical distinguishing
feature, may be desirable in special circumstances, but it does not require
a separate legal interest.1 51 Moreover, if third-party beneficiary theory is
available, someone other than the original grantor will not need a sepa-
rate device, such as the executory limitation, to allow them to enforce a
land use right. 152
148. See, eg., Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61
N.Y.2d 154, 160, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1339-40, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904-05 (1984); Crowley v. Knapp,
94 Wis. 2d 421,438, 288 N.W.2d 815, 823-24 (1980); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 16-13-21-14 (Burns
Supp. 1985) (stating that restrictions which permit residential use of property yet prohibit use of
property as a residence for the developmentally disabled or mentally ill are void as against public
policy).
149. See, ag., Wier v. Isenberg, 95 Ill. App. 3d 839, 842-45, 420 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1981) (stating
proposition, but holding that restrictive covenant did not violate public policy in that it prevented
grantee from practicing psychotherapy in his home); Bob Layne Contractor, Inc. v. Buennagel, 158
Ind. App. 43, 53, 301 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1973) (stating proposition, but granting permanent injunc-
tion enjoining violation of restrictive covenant after deciding that vacating blocks in subdivision did
not violate public policy).
150. There is an institutional reason why the law should not preserve separate labels and rules
for defeasible fees and servitudes. People may lose confidence in a legal system when interests that
seem identical are treated differently and when a drastically different remedy results solely from
using certain arcane words.
151. For a description of the array of remedies that could apply to a single interest, see infra
subpart IV(A).
152. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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Additionally, the defeasible estate's origin and strong historical tra-
dition should not prevent unification. 15 3 Although generations of law-
yers have been schooled that there is a valid distinction between
conditions and servitudes, 154 and players in the legal system are invested
in the existing structure, these considerations, like historical tradition, do
not make the present structure any more valid or conceptually sound.
The inevitable uncertainty in defining the limits of merger cannot justify
the current state of the law. Because no arguments opposing unification
are convincing,15 5 careful and sensitive unification of the law of condi-
tions and servitudes, like the proposed merger of covenants, equitable
servitudes, and easements into a single law of servitudes, is possible.
B. The Means to Unification
1. Merger and Unification or Integration Models.-Different meth-
ods of joining the law of servitudes and defeasible fees are available. One
model is a merger, in which a single interest, perhaps with a new name
such as a "land obligation,"' 56 emerges. Another model is unification or
integration, in which interests retain separate names but the doctrine is
made consistent. A desire to break from the past and to prevent back-
sliding into old doctrines favors the merger technique, while history, fa-
miliarity, and residual learning support the unification or integration
approach. Either method achieves the key objective of harmonizing the
law.
2. Legislative and Judicial Approaches.-Either the legislature or
the courts can achieve unification. The advantages of legislation are sev-
eral. For one, it provides a comprehensive resolution of the issues. In-
deed, a merger may be impossible without broad-based statutory reform.
Additionally, a clear legislative directive aids parties in predicting the
results of their agreements and thus increases their confidence.
153. Real covenants are thought to derive from Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
See Reichman, supra note 6, at 1188 n.43. Defeasible fees predate this origin. See 2A R. POWELL &
P. ROHAN, supra note 46, 178.
154. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dep't cf Transp. v. Tolke, 36 Or. App. 751, 757, 586 P.2d 791, 795
(1978) (characterizing the phrase "so long as" as "magic words" that create a fee simple determina-
ble); Klamath Falls v. Fliteraft, 7 Or. App. 330, 334, 490 P.2d 515, 517 (1971) (holding that the
phrase "so long as" is distinctive language of fee simple determinable).
155. In determining the retroactivity of unification, concerns about reliance on the status quo
may be legitimate. Another important argument is that of the slippery slope, which might lead to
further amalgamation of other similar, but functionally incompatible, interests such as leases and
trusts. A careful unification, however, can provide sufficient guideposts for planners and decision
makers so that only a recognizable law of land use allocation rights will emerge.
156. See generally Sturley, supra note 6, at 1436-38 (discussing an English proposal to unify
servitudes as "land obligations").
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A statutory approach, however, only provides a broad standard to
which courts must give meaning. Thus, the solutions suggested in Part
IV for remedies, permissible subject matter, in gross interests, and a pub-
lic-interest termination standard require the evolutionary treatment of
judicial lawmaking, in which courts apply existing rules to new facts. 157
Although judicial lawmaking is necessary, a legislative declaration of a
unification goal and an outline of the substantive issues would be benefi-
cial in setting the judicial parameters.
This Article presents a basis for judicial unification of defeasible fees
and servitudes even absent legislation. Unification essentially requires
the judiciary to rationalize a legal doctrine. Legislative fact-finding and
balancing of competing political interests are not prerequisites to success-
ful unification. Courts can address effectively the substantive issues of an
integrated law. Effective common-law decision making always involves,
and should invoke, policy analysis. Judicial consideration of these topics
is aided by law reform documents, most notably the continuing work on
the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes). 15
3. Donative Transfers.-As an initial matter, a unified law must
determine whether there are valid distinctions between rules of law appli-
cable to nongratuitous and donative defeasible fees. More precisely,
should the unification of conditions and servitudes include only transfers
in which real consideration is paid, leaving gratuitous grants to separate
doctrines of law? On balance, the answer to this difficult question is that
unification should make no such distinction.1 59
First, regardless of the gratuitous nature of the transfer, the same
157. For examples of conditions and servitudes statutes that require judicial development, see
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3275 (West 1970) (allowing courts to provide relief from forfeiture), construed in
Atkins v. Anderson, 139 Cal. App. 2d 918, 920, 294 P.2d 727, 729 (1956); MICH. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 554.46 (West 1967) (allowing invalidation of conditions that provide no substantial benefit
to the enforcer); MINN. STAT. § 500.20(1) (1986) (same). Statutes that attempt to resolve the issues
by setting automatic termination dates for conditions are easily applied, but provide incomplete
solutions.
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) (Prelim. Draft No. 3, 1987).
159. This Article questions the position of the Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Trans-
fers) to the extent that it treats donative transactions separately from commercial situations, see, eg.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) introduction at 1 (1981); id. § 3.4
comment a & reporter's note 1, and does not require judicial scrutiny of restraints on land use in
donative transfers, see id. § 3.4, § 5.1 comment b.
For similar reasons, this Article questions the charity-to-charity exception in CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 45-97 (1975), which provides for a thirty-year limit on the effectiveness of rights of entry
and possibilities of reverter; some courts' exemption of commercial transfers from the Rule Against
Perpetuities, see, e.g., Camerlo v. Howard Johnson Co., 545 F. Supp. 395, 397 (W.D. Pa. 1982);
Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 610 P.2d 772, 776 (Okla. 1980); and the nonapplicability of the Rule
Against Perpetuities to transfers when all interests are for charitable purposes, see Dukeminier,
supra note 65, at 1908.
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antirestrictions concerns arise when enforcement is sought against a suc-
cessor. Indeed, because market forces do not constrain a donor's behav-
ior, he is free to place ecceni~ric ties on the land, making antirestrictions
controls especially desirable. Second, unification presents no significant
disincentives to making socially desirable donative transfers. The initial
donor usually can strictly enforce the land use right against the initial
donee on freedom of contract grounds,160 and rarely will antirestrictions
concerns allow a donee's successor to avoid enforcement when the re-
striction is socially desirable. Finally, the difficulty in determining
whether consideration has been paid makes a rule based on a distinction
between nongratuitous and donative transfers unworkable. 161
IV. The Substantive Issues: The Shape of a Unified Law
The doctrinal rules of an integrated law of servitudes and conditions
must rest on legitimate policy concerns. The current law of defeasible
fees and servitudes revolves primarily around buzzwords and arcane re-
quirements, burying policy considerations beneath the surface. The ten-
sion between freedom of contract and the antirestrictions policy requires
a straightforward resolution. Somewhat surprisingly, the law of fees on
condition provides a better solution than the law of servitudes for a
number of the common issues. Even without unification, this discussion
suggests a need to reshape certain current doctrines of servitudes. 162
A. Remedies
1. The Calculus of Remedies.-Because the forfeiture remedy
presents significant difficulties for efficient land use and fairness, 163 an
integrated law must circumscribe its role. Courts should not avoid en-
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) pt. III introductory
note (1981).
161. E.g., Springmeyer v. City of S. Lake Tahoe, 132 Cal. App. 3d 375, 377 n.1, 183 Cal. Rptr.
43, 44 n.1 (1982) (land donated to city for purpose of constructing city government buildings);
Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82 v. Tosc no, 257 Cal. App. 2d 22, 24-25, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816, 817 (1967)
(land bequeathed by ex-lodge member for the lodge's use). On other facts, the presence or the extent
of consideration is difficult to determine. See, eg., State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. LoBue, 83
Nev. 221, 223, 427 P.2d 639, 640 (1961) (finding oral representation by grantee that it would build a
street benefiting grantor's retained land to constitute consideration); Higdon v. Davis, 315 N.C. 208,
214, 337 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1985) (holding that the consideration included the condition requiring
grantee to maintain right-of-way); Rourk v. Brunswick County, 46 N.C. App. 795, 797-98, 266
S.E.2d 401, 403 (1980) (holding condition that grantee would build public health center to be consid-
eration to grantor, a physician).
162. Other issues that must be resolved in integrating servitudes and defeasible fees, such as
privity and informal creation of interests, are left for other forums. See Berger, Integration, supra
note 6, at 355.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
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forcement of forfeiture through resort to artifices, nor should they
mechanically permit it. New doctrines must accommodate the compet-
ing policy interests and adopt the beneficial aspects of remedies for both
defeasible fees and servitudes. An integrated law can then offer a supe-
rior array of remedies when compared to the remedies currently available
for the separate interests.
Courts should not enforce a conveyance's forfeiture clause automati-
cally, but should consider it as one possible remedy for breach of the
condition. 164 They might award instead damages or an injunction when
appropriate. This approach departs significantly from the current law of
conditions. 165 Presently, a court must choose either all or nothing when
enforcing a condition-either ordering forfeiture or not upholding the
land use allocation right. 166 Damages and injunctive relief are unavaila-
ble for a condition unless the court chooses to transform it into a real
covenant. By combining the remedies of conditions and servitudes, unifi-
cation would allow courts to fashion rules for relief that recognize both
antirestrictions and freedom of contract values.
An array of remedies would benefit parties by greatly increasing the
courts' flexibility and ability to shape results in order to fulfill the parties'
true needs. Moreover, it would minimize the deleterious effects of the
forfeiture remedy but preserve forfeiture in favor of the grantor or a des-
ignated third party when the parties have consented to it, when damages
and equitable relief are inadequate, and when society's transcendent
goals are not disturbed. The limited availability of forfeiture represents
an advantage over the current law of servitudes in which no such remedy
exists.
2. Illustrative Situations.-Consider, for example, a defeasible fee
that imposes a negative restriction, such as a limitation on the nature and
quality of improvements. 67 As with real covenants, an injunction
against a threatened violation achieves the grantor's goal of preventing
certain improvements. The court could order cessation of the offending
164. A court's refusal to enforce forfeiture and substitution of alternate remedies is analogous to
the court's rejection of a specific enforcement clause in a contract.
165. Some courts may hesitate to rewrite the remedy agreement of the parties. See Stueber v.
Arrowhead Farm Estates Ltd. Partnership, 69 Md. App. 775, 781, 519 A.2d 816, 819 (1987).
166. For ways in which the court attempts to justify different solutions, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 85-90.
167. See, eg., Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 260-61, 116 P. 729, 731 (1911) (minimum value
for residence); Springmeyer v. City of S. Lake Tahoe, 132 Cal. App. 3d 375, 382, 183 Cal. Rptr. 43,
47 (1982) (governmental purposes); Shields v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 225 Cal. App.
2d 330, 334, 37 Cal. Rptr. 360, 362-63 (1964) (single-family dwelling); McArdle v. School Dist., 179
Neb. 122, 130-31, 136 N.W.2d 422, 427-28 (1965) (school purposes); Murray v. Trustees of the Lane
Seminary, 1 Ohio Op. 2d 236, 237, 140 N.E.2d 577, 579 (1956) (dwelling houses).
565
Texas Law Review
conduct and removal of the offending structures. 16 If the grantor or
third-party beneficiary owns a benefited parcel, damages would equal the
diminution of the parcel's vlue caused by the violation, 169 as is the case
with real covenants. A negative restriction in which damages or an in-
junction would be inadequate and forfeiture thus necessary to effectuate
the land allocation agreement is hard to imagine.
Similarly, an injunction or damages usually suffice when a defeasible
fee requires the grantee to do an affirmative act, such as placing a plaque
on a building, 170 building a roadway, 17 or refinancing the acquired prop-
erty. 172 A court either could order performance of the act or award dam-
ages based on the actual loss. to the grantor or third-party beneficiary. 173
For some affirmative conditions, however, forfeiture is the only ade-
quate and appropriate remedy. Consider a governmental entity seeking
to spur economic development in the region. To that end, it conveys a
piece of land, perhaps at a bargain price, to an entity that is to erect an
industrial facility. The grantor intends the project to provide jobs and
also to serve as an anchor for attracting future development to the area,
and so the grantor includes a condition obligating the grantee to build
the designated facility within a specified time, with forfeiture to result
upon failure to do so. If the grantee fails to comply and has no valid
defenses, damages would be difficult, if not impossible, to calculate; any-
thing short of having the facility erected on the desired location probably
would be inadequate and would not satisfy the objectives of the grantor.
Injunctive relief may be an insufficient remedy as well. If the grantee's
default results from financial or technical inability to perform the job, an
injunction ordering performance would be inappropriate. Even if the
grantee could perform, a court might hesitate to order injunctive relief
168. See, e.g., Jones v. Northwest Real Estate Co., 149 Md. 271, 277-78, 131 A. 446, 449 (1925)
(real covenant; removal of offending porch); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 89-
97, 390 N.E.2d 243, 246-49 (1979) (real covenant; injunction against threatened breach). Conditions
held in gross, in which the grantor has no benefited land, present added difficulty in understanding
the grantor's motive for the prohibition. Under an integrated law, enforcement of such restrictions
should not be permitted.
169. For real covenants cases discussing the calculation of damages, see infra note 208. When
the grantor or third-party beneficiary owns no neighboring parcel, damages calculation is more
difficult.
170. E.g., Springmeyer v. City of S. Lake Tahoe, 132 Cal. App. 3d 375, 378, 183 Cal. Rptr. 43,
44 (1982).
171. E.g., Lincoln v. Narom Dev. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 619, 625, 89 Cal. Rptr. 128, 132 (1970).
172. E.g., Nielsen v. Woods, 687 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
173. See generally Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Marshall, 136 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1890) (advocating money
damages rather than an injunction when railroad violated its covenant to use town as a terminus);
Carolina & N.W. Ry. v. Carpenter, 165 N.C. 465, 468, 81 S.E. 682, 683 (1914) (allowing grantor
either to compel railroad company to lay track and erect a station on property granted or to pay
damages).
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because the forced performance could be of low quality and because such
an order is of an oppressive nature.174
For this example, forfeiture is probably the only adequate rem-
edy. 175 Before allowing forfeiture, however, the court must employ its
equitable powers to avoid the problems of windfall to the grantor, unfair-
ness to the grantee, and underutilization of land. In recognizing these
problems, a court could require the grantor to return the purchase price
with interest and reimbursement for taxes and basic maintenance. The
court also could grant an offset for the reasonable rental of the property
during the grantee's occupancy and for any other damages proved by the
grantor. 176
3. Support for Avoiding Forfeiture.-Some doctrine supports a
court's refusal to apply forfeiture automatically. First, public policy con-
siderations occasionally trump private agreements.1 77 A long-standing
tradition of judicial intervention to prevent forfeiture of fees on condition
only recently has receded. 17 8 In addition, a few courts already have
taken a flexible approach to remedies in fee on condition cases. 179 These
174. The decision in County of Abbeville v. Knox, 267 S.C. 38, 42-43, 225 S.E.2d 863, 865
(1976), similar to the text hypothetical, indicates the problem with the current law of conditions.
The court voided the condition because of case precedent that had developed to prevent the usually
unjust effect of forfeiture: restrictive words after a grant of a fee simple absolute are ineffective. This
decision is the unfortunate result of a failure to address the true policy issues arising in fees on
condition. For another example of a condition imposed by government, see Collard v. Incorporated
Village, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 603-04, 421 N.E.2d 818, 822-23, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326, 330-31 (1981) (refusing
to void landowner's covenant with city not to erect structures without permission despite city's
unreasonable withholding of consent).
175. Another example in which forfeiture may be appropriate is when a grantor conveys subdivi-
sion lots with a condition designed to create communal stability and enhance property values. But
see Tristram's Group, Inc. v. Morrow, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 980, 981, 496 N.E.2d 176, 178 (1986)
(construing condition requiring grantee of subdivision lot to build within four years to be an option
that has been barred by laches due to lapse of eleven years).
176. Other damages might reflect lost opportunities to sell the land during grantee's possession.
The specific nature of these damages would depend on the circumstances. For example, if the price
of the land dropped during the grantee's occupancy, the court might require the return of the cur-
rent fair market value rather than the purchase price. Also, the improvements reimbursement would
depend on whether the improvements were generically beneficial or only related to the grantee's
needs. For cases in which the parties attempted to provide for the grantor's refund of consideration
upon forfeiture, see Mead v. Ballard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 290 (1868); Board of Comm'rs v. Russell, 174
F.2d 778 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 338 U.S. 820 (1949); Nielsen v. Woods, 687 P.2d 486 (Colo. Ct
App. 1984); Genet v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 150 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 155 So.
2d 551 (Fla. 1963). See also E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.5, at 825 (1982) (describing the
court's flexibility in framing an equitable order).
177. See, eg., Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 587-88, 10 P.2d 496, 497-98 (1932) (finding
that public policy against restrictions based on race overrode the parties' agreement); Riste v. East-
ern Wash. Bible Camp, Inc., 25 Wash. App. 299, 301, 605 P.2d 1294, 1295 (1980) (relying on the
rule against direct restraints on alienation to invalidate a restriction on public policy grounds).
178. See 4 J. KENT, supra note 96, at *129.
179. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Narom Dev. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 619, 625, 89 Cal. Rptr. 128, 132
(1970) (preferring completion of contemplated road as a more appropriate equitable remedy than
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precedents and the arguments set out in this Article form the basis for
courts to provide alternate remedies in defeasible fee cases, even if they
fail to endorse the concept of integration in its entirety.
Finally, contract law provides additional support for courts to ig-
nore the remedy specified by the parties in favor of its own. If courts
were to conceptualize forfeiture as a form of liquidated damages for
breaches of land use allocation agreements, forfeiture would be vulnera-
ble to judicial attack as an in terrorem clause (an unreasonable stipula-
tion of the damages) or as a shotgun clause (recovery for any type of
breach regardless of its significance).1 80 Additionally, courts are not
bound by an agreement specifying equitable relief1 81 and may view forfei-
ture as an equitable remedy ,n order to avoid enforcement of a forfeiture
provision.
B. In Gross Interests
In light of the antirestrictions policy, how should an integrated law
of servitudes and defeasible fees treat in gross interests? Specifically, will
the burden of an in gross interest bind a successor and can the benefit be
transferred?1 82 The running of burdens invokes dead hand issues. Trans-
action costs increase when benefits are transferred because of the need to
trace owners.
L Running of Burdens.-The antirestrictions policy requires that
the burden of negative and affirmative interests not be imposed on a suc-
cessor when the benefit is in gross. Some exceptions are required, how-
ever, because of other significant public policy considerations. But even
forfeiture to original grantee); Nielsen v. Woods, 687 P.2d 486, 488-89 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (refus-
ing to order forfeiture for grantee's failure to satisfy refinance condition when the object of the
condition--obtaining financing-was already accomplished through restoration of grantor's VA
mortgage eligibility); see also Creamer) Dairy Co. v. Electric Park Co., 138 S.W. 1106, 1107 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1911, no writ) (preventing forfeiture of a leasehold on equitable grounds
when tender required by covenant was made at time of notification of termination).
180. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979) (stating that liqui-
dated damages are permitted only if reasonable in light of anticipated or actual loss and difficulties
of proof of loss); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 176, § 12.18, at 896-902 (discussing distinctions be-
tween penalties and valid liquidated damages provisions).
181. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 176, § 12.6, at 831-32 (discussing how consensual limita-
tion of equitable remedies is not binding on courts); Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L.
REv. 351, 369-76 (1978) (discussing the reluctance of courts to enforce privately created specific
performance or injunctive remedies). But see MacNeil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 495, 520-23 (1962) (staling that denial of specific performance may infringe on free-
dom of contract, especially when the parties have agreed to the remedy).
182. While the burden of an in gross easement is assumed to run with the land, see Marlatt v.
Peoria Water Works Co., 114 Ill. App. 2d 11, 14, 252 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1969), the assignability of
the benefit is disputed. See 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 28, 419 (discussing transferabil-
ity of benefits in gross).
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in these exceptional cases, courts may rely on other doctrines to avoid
the exception if perpetual rights threaten antirestriction values and raise
efficiency concerns. 183
One exception should occur when the in gross right provides an
identifiable and significant benefit to its owner's commercial interest.
This exception would encompass affirmative easements in gross such as
railroad corridors,18 4 mineral rights,1 85 and water, sewer, oil, gas, and
utility lines.186 Certain affirmative covenants or conditions also should
be included, such as a promise to maintain on the property a warehouse
that benefits the grantor's business' 87 or an obligation to purchase the
products sold on the property from the grantor, if they are of reasonable
duration and do not violate anticompetitive concerns. 18 8 These obliga-
tions often are necessary to encourage commencement of desirable com-
mercial activities.
The rights within this exception do not involve dead hand control
exerted by an outside entity. Rather, enforcement of these rights is justi-
fied by their commercial importance' 89 and because they efficiently allo-
cate land use privileges. Although they do restrict the servient owner's
acts to some extent, they usually intrude only on a limited portion of the
burdened land. Moreover, people may hesitate to transfer fees if these
key rights appended to the transfer are not enforceable.
A burden related to an in gross benefit also might be enforced when
the party seeking enforcement can demonstrate a direct and significant
benefit to a clearly defined, publicly desirable interest. For example, a
court may permit the burdens of in gross conservation restrictions to run
183. For example, courts may employ termination and modification doctrines to alter a general
principle that a burden should run.
184. See, eg., Farrell v. Hodges Stock Yards, Inc., 343 So. 2d 1364, 1366-68 (La. 1977) (enforc-
ing servitude agreement granting right-of-way to railroad against easement grantors' successors).
185. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 comment f(1944) (recognizing that easement may
include right to sever minerals).
186. See, eg., Kleinheider v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 528 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1975) (enforcing
right-of-way contract for oil and gas pipelines against easement grantors' successors); City of
Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co., 17 Cal. 2d 576, 578-80, 110 P.2d 983, 984-85
(1941) (construing exclusivity of grant of easement for water lines).
187. See, eg., Genet v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 150 So. 2d 272, 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (grantor
hoped that the warehouse would increase demand for its freight haulage business), cert. denied, 155
So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1963).
188. See, e.g., Trosper v. Shoemaker, 312 Ky. 344, 346-47, 227 S.W.2d 176, 178 (1949) (uphold-
ing grantee's covenant to sell one brand of petroleum products exclusively on filling station prem-
ises); Staebler-Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac's Auto Mart, Inc., 329 Mich. 351, 356-57,45 N.W.2d 316, 318-
19 (1951) (same); Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950,
950-51, 344 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31-32 (1973) (same).
189. See C. CLARK, supra note 28, at 81-89 (stating that assignability may turn on the value or
importance of the interest).
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because of the recognized public interest in preservation. 190 Other af-
firmative rights that are not justified by commercial importance, such as
a parking privilege, 191 may be enforceable against the successor of the
burdened land because of the utility of such arrangements and their lim-
ited intrusiveness.
2. Transfer of Benefit;.-The benefits of in gross land use rights
should not run except when -the burdens bind a successor. This rule lim-
its the dead hand and reduces the excessive transaction costs that often
result from such transfers. In addition, a recording system for assign-
ments would minimize transaction costs by keeping ownership informa-
tion current.19 2
When a burden does rut., the benefit should run only if the successor
receives a benefit similar to the original interest holder's benefit and the
original parties clearly did not intend that the right be nonassignable. 193
For example, a successor conservation foundation can assume the benefit
of an in gross conservation interest. Similarly, a railroad company can
transfer its lines to another railroad without forfeiting any rights. In
both cases, the successor is likely to benefit much like its predecessor
from the in gross interest, and the importance of the interest justifies its
enforcement.
3. Special Cases.-Certain other exceptions to the general in gross
enforcement prohibition are appropriate in light of policy considerations.
Courts should enforce government-owned in gross interests, whether
negative or affirmative, against successors to the burdened land. Many
important land use controls are achievable only by a governmental en-
tity's ownership of a negative restriction.1 94 The governmental entity
must be in a position to enforce affirmative undertakings in conveyances
that benefit the area.195 The political process assures the flexibility and
190. See Korngold, supra note 6, at 442-47.
191. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 492 illus. 1 (1944).
192. See, eg., CAL. CIv. CODE § 885.030 (West Supp. 1987) (requiring re-recording within 30
years); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.24 (West Supp. 1987) (same); see also Sturley, Easements in Gross,
96 LAW Q. REv. 557, 566-67 (1980) (arguing that registration mitigates antirestrictions problems for
easements in gross). A five year re-recording period would be helpful without being onerous.
193. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 491-492 (1944).
194. In City of Idaho Springs v. Golden Say. & Loan Ass'n, 29 Colo. App. 119, 123, 480 P.2d
847, 849 (1970), the city wanted a municipal swimming pool, but lacked the funds to construct it.
The city conveyed land to a grantee under the condition that the property be used solely as a pool.
A court must enforce such a land use restriction, even though held in gross, in order to permit land
use allocation that meets community needs. But see Selectmen of the Town of Nahant v. United
States, 293 F. Supp. 1076, 1078 (D. Ma;s. 1968) (stating that mere recital in the deed of the purpose
to which land is to be put is insufficient to limit the estate granted).
195. Cf. Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 260-62, 139 A.2d 291, 298-99 (1958) (de-
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democratic control of local land use decisions that the usual in gross re-
striction threatens.
Additionally, courts should permit homeowners associations to en-
force land use rights on behalf of lot owners.196 This situation does not
involve veto power asserted by someone external to the land because the
owners themselves control the association. The homeowners association
exception enhances flexibility and increases efficiency by reducing the
transaction costs that would result from multiple enforcement.
C. Touch and Concern
An integrated law of defeasible fees and servitudes should limit the
subject matter of private land use arrangements and should invalidate
those arrangements that create antirestrictions problems or eccentric ties.
But unlike current treatment, courts should face these issues directly in-
stead of burying them within classic touch and concern ruminations. An
integrated law requires clear articulation of the contract and antirestric-
tions dichotomy and the rules dealing with particular categories of troub-
lesome land use rights, such as anticompetitive covenants and affirmative
obligations. 197 Although an integrated law can look to current touch and
concern doctrine for guidance, the test must not take on a life of its own.
Cases involving restrictions on the sale and manufacture of liquor
illustrate the danger of a rigid touch and concern test and the need for
policy analysis. These restrictions present troubling questions about sub-
ject matter. Should they be upheld as legitimate, appurtenant ties
designed to maintain quality of life in a neighborhood, or invalidated as
an attempt to impose a personal or religious belief on a landowner with-
out any direct benefit to land owned by the grantor? A number of courts
interpreting such restrictions when cast as conditions have focused di-
dining to enforce condition requiring grantees to fill swamp land for city land redevelopment be-
cause city had modified time for performance but had not eliminated the requirement of
performance); Collard v. Incorporated Village, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 599-603, 421 N.E.2d 818, 821-22,
439 N.Y.S.2d 326, 329-30 (1981) (noting that permissible spot zoning is "part of a well-considered
and comprehensive plan calculated to serve the general welfare of the community").
196. See, e.g., Merrionette Manor Homes Improvement Ass'n v. Heda, 11111. App. 2d 186, 190-
91, 136 N.E.2d 556, 558-59 (1956) (holding that property owners association could maintain action
to enjoin restrictive covenant violation); Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say.
Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 262, 15 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1938) (holding that property owners association could
foreclose on lien for nonpayment of assessments); cf. Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Bancroft, 209
Mass. 217, 223, 95 N.E. 216, 219 (1911) (stating that development company could enforce restric-
tions even though it no longer owned any of the land).
197. For example, it is unclear whether a covenant requiring grantee or his successor to refi-
nance the property's mortgage within two years, which restores grantor's VA loan eligibility, would
touch and concern under traditional analysis, even though good reasons support binding a successor.
For a case discussing a condition similar to this covenant, see Nielsen v. Woods, 687 P.2d 486 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984).
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rectly on the difficult policy issues. They have discussed possible motives
behind such conditions: to uphold "the social and moral welfare of the
community by preventing intemperance,"' 198 to impose personal and reli-
gious beliefs, 199 to create an "ideal city," 2° ° or to restrain trade.201 These
courts have decided the condition's validity based on their views of its
goals. Under an integrated law, courts should tie these motives into the
policy dichotomy and focus their analysis on the condition's import.
In one noteworthy case the court denied enforcement of a condition
barring the sale of liquor against a successor when the grantor no longer
owned land in the area.20 2 The court indicated its sensitivity to the reach
of the dead hand in explaining that a grantor may not impose conditions
"as his fancy may dictate" and seek enforcement although he is not
harmed by the breach.20 3 This approach is consistent with an integrated
law's framework for judicial decision.
D. Termination and Modification Doctrines
A unified law should adopt the changed conditions doctrine and the
related theories in fees on condition law2°4 to permit removal of obsolete
land ties. These approaches, which focus on the functional validity of
land rights allocation agreements, are preferable to legislation setting ar-
bitrary time limits on such interests.20 5 Professor French, in a recent
article on servitudes, argues against enforcement of affirmative obliga-
tions that become unduly burdensome, obsolete, wasteful, or unreasona-
ble.20 6 Moreover, she urges courts to use modification and termination
procedures when dealing with problematic servitudes. 20 7 An integrated
law should adopt such an approach because it furthers the antirestric-
tions policy and encourages flexible decision making.
198. Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376, 379, 92 P. 1022, 1023 (1907).
199. See, e.g., Kaczynski v. Lindah', 5 Mich. App. 377, 380, 146 N.W.2d 675, 676 (1966); see
also Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 442, 58 A.2d 89, 94 (Ch. 1948) (recogniz-
ing that restrictive covenant was intended to assure grantors that country club would not become
"gathering place for individuals partial to use of intoxicants").
200. Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., 152 Colo. 162, 168, 381 P.2d 13, 16 (1963).
201. See, e.g., Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376, 380, 92 P. 1022, 1023 (1907); Fusha v. Dacono
Townsite Co., 60 Colo. 315, 318, 153 P. 226, 227 (1915).
202. Barrie v. Smith, 47 Mich. 130, 134, 10 N.W. 168, 170 (1881).
203. Id. In real covenant cases, courts generally ignore the policy considerations of liquor re-
strictions. See, e.g., El Di, Inc. v. Town of Bethany Beach, 477 A.2d 1066, 1070 (Del. 1984); Clary
v. Lamont, 67 So. 2d 227, 227 (Fla. 1953); Reichert v. Weeden, 618 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Mont. 1980);
Benner v. Tacony Athletic Ass'n, 328 Pa. 577, 579, 196 A. 390, 392 (1938).
204. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-97 (West 1981) (30 years); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 689.18(3) (West Supp. 1987) (21 years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, paras. 37b-37h (Smith-Hurd
1969) (40 years); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 3 (West 1977) (30 years).
206. French, supra note 6, at 1316-17.
207. Id. at 1313-18.
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In addition, a unified law must go beyond the current law of condi-
tions and servitudes and provide a mechanism whereby a court can re-
fuse equitable enforcement of a land allocation agreement when that
enforcement violates the public interest. Injunctive relief ignores the pol-
icy dichotomy essential to conditions and servitudes. Damage awards
could, in most cases, adequately remedy the harm.20 This doctrinal ad-
vance would respect the values of freedom of contract and yet enable a
court to effectuate the antirestrictions policy by preventing excessive
dead hand control in extraordinary situations. A public interest doctrine
also harmonizes an integrated law with the classic doctrine that "the in-
terests of... the public are factors to be considered in determining the
appropriateness of injunction against tort. 20 9 While a public interest
test may add ambiguity and require greater judicial resources, it is neces-
sary for adequate resolution of the contracts and antirestrictions policy
conflict. Courts could employ such a public policy doctrine to resolve
the problems that arise when private restrictions in effect bar land use
that would benefit the community.
E. The Rule Against Perpetuities
A unified law should not incorporate the Rule Against Perpetuities
for all conditions and servitudes. The substance of the common-law
Rule and its automatic and remorseless nature do not adequately address
freedom of contract and antirestrictions concerns.21 0
The courts mercilessly apply the Rule even though it defeats the
grantor's express intention.21' The Rule clearly does more violence than
necessary to freedom of contract concerns, and threatens the moral im-
perative, economic efficiency, and freedom of choice inherent in private
arrangements. Moreover, the Rule applies prospectively to void an exec-
208. The measure of damages could be the diminution in the value of the benefited parcel attrib-
utable to the breach. See, e.g., Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 116, 139 A. 508, 511 (1927)
(refusing injunction ordering destruction of house, and awarding damages measured by diminution
in value of benefited estate); Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc. v. Philwold Estates, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d
253, 267, 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1316, 437 N.Y.S.2d 291, 297 (1981) (stating that owners of benefited
land would be entitled to prove damages when restriction is extinguished). For in gross interests
when the violation is total and permanent, damages could be the difference in the market values of
the burdened land with and without the restriction. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(h)(3), 48
Fed. Reg. 22940, 22947 (1983). Limitation of the remedy to damages is not a taking, which could
raise constitutional issues. See Korngold, supra note 6, at 465-66.
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 942, at 586 (1976).
210. The Rule Against Perpetuities confers only limited benefits by fixing a maximum time pe-
riod during which an executory limitation must vest. This in turn holds down the number of poten-
tial transferees, thus reducing tracing costs, and confines dead hand control to a specified time.
211. See, e.g., Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 142, 158
(1855); Shipton v. Sheridan, 531 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Standard Knitting Mills, Inc.
v. Allen, 221 Tenn. 90, 101, 424 S.W.2d 796, 801 (1967).
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utory interest. This approach can prevent divestment of the original
grantee's estate, which runs counter to the traditional view that the
agreement should be enforced between the original parties. 212
At the same time, the Rule does not resolve antirestrictions issues
adequately. The Rule is underinclusive because it allows some interests
that pose antirestrictions problems2 13 and overinclusive because it voids
rights when no true dead hand issue exists.214 The antirestrictions bene-
fits of the Rule, therefore, dc not justify its offensiveness to contract con-
cerns. Similarly, the Rule is applied without regard to the in gross issue.
Indeed, rigid application of the doctrine has resulted in favoring in gross
over appurtenant interests in some cases. 215 Additionally, the condition's
subject matter is not a factor in Rule Against Perpetuities analysis. The
Rule can void a condition prohibiting the consumption of alcohol on the
premises without inquiry into potentially valid purposes behind the con-
dition.2 16 Also, to the extent the Rule sets arbitrary time limits on condi-
tions, it is an unsatisfactory termination device because it is unable to
provide courts with the flexibility necessary to effectuate the policy di-
chotomy. Finally, the Rule does not apply when charities hold both the
present and future interest.217 Although this charity-to-charity exception
does recognize significant policy mandates, it leaves dead hand control
unchecked for such interests. An integrated law would instill flexibility
that is unavailable under the wooden approach of the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
Additional disadvantages plague the Rule. Its complexity creates
212. See supra note 78 and supra text accompanying note 160. Even under various reform doc-
trines such as wait-and-see and cy pres, see Dukeminier, supra note 65, at 1880-87, 1898-901, the
Rule could void an executory interest while the property is held by the original grantee.
213. For example, the Rule does not apply to possibilities of reverter even though they may
create antirestrictions problems. See supra note 63. Moreover, the Rule does not void interests that
vest within the requisite period even though they may be held in gross or involve questionable sub-
ject matter. See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
214. The Rule could automatically void an executory limitation in favor of a governmental en-
tity or a homeowners association even though no dead hand control concerns are present. See supra
text accompanying notes 194-96. Similarly, the Rule could prevent land use allocation agreements
when benefits are not held in gross. See Fayette County v. Morton, 282 Ky. 481, 485, 138 S.W.2d
953, 955 (1940) (neighbors could not enforce condition without creating Rule Against Perpetuities
problem); County School Bd. v. Dowell, 190 Va. 676, 688, 58 S.E.2d 38, 43 (1950) (same).
215. For example, if the grantor creates a fee simple determinable followed by an executory
limitation in favor of the owner of the criginal tract from which the conveyed parcel was taken, and
the Rule voids the executory interest, only an heir of the grantor or successor could enforce the
condition, and not the neighbor now owning the tract. See, e.g., Jones v. Burns, 221 Miss. 833, 842,
74 So. 2d 866, 868 (1954); Shipton v. Sheridan, 531 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Yar-
brough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 231, 269 S.W. 36, 38-39 (1925).
216. See Betts v. Snyder, 341 Pa. 465, 467-68, 19 A.2d 82, 83 (1941); cf. Knowles v. South
County Hosp., 87 R.I. 303, 308, 140 A.2d 499, 501-02 (1958) (upholding condition requiring annual
growth of at least one peck of Indian maize, or Rhode Island johnnycake corn).
217. See Dukeminier, supra note 65, at 1908.
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traps for even the wary.218 Moreover, the technical manipulation of the
Rule is so daunting that this alone becomes the focus of courts, which
diverts their attention from important policy issues. Reliance on this
technical doctrine as the ratio decidendi allows decision makers to hide
the unarticulated and often determinative policy reasons for a deci-
sion.219 While current doctrine, which applies the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities to executory limitations but not their functional equivalents, is
unsatisfactory,220 expanding the Rule's application to conditions is not
the appropriate response.221 The Rule should not apply to any interests
that allocate land use rights. The law can strike a better balance between
freedom of contract and antirestrictions policies through the unified law
that this Article has suggested for remedies, in gross ownership, interest
subject matter, and termination and modification doctrines.
V. Conclusion
Planners and decision makers currently are confronted by separate
legal rules for defeasible fees and servitudes even though these interests
are functional equivalents, share the same policy bases, and present com-
mon problems of private land use allocation devices. Classification of an
interest is critical in the present system of decision by labeling and rigid
adherence to history. The courts do not confront adequately the compet-
ing values of freedom of contract and the antirestrictions policy.
Defeasible fees and servitudes must be integrated into a single law of
private land use allocation devices to eliminate unjustifiable inconsisten-
cies among the interests. The substantive rules of arcane doctrine should
be replaced with substantive rules derived from a unified law that ad-
dresses the real and current problems of private land use control through
careful balancing of contract and antirestrictions considerations. Inte-
gration can eliminate the ambivalence over forfeiture and make it avail-
able for the special situations that merit it. A unified law can curtail in
gross interests that threaten antirestrictions values, limit subject matter
218. Id. at 1905-06.
219. See County School Bd. v. Dowell, 190 Va. 676, 684-85, 58 S.E.2d 38, 41-42 (1950) (unclear
whether concern over deterioration of property during grantee's occupancy led to court's upholding
possibility of reverter despite Rule Against Perpetuities).
220. Under the current regime, classification of an interest determines its validity. One court
observed: "[I]f the ... deed had undertaken to confine the reversion to the ultimate owner of the
adjoining property... unquestionably the restriction would be void as offending the statute against
perpetuities. But we do not so construe it, and, therefore,.., the provision for reverter was valid."
Fayette County v. Morton, 282 Ky. 481, 485, 138 S.W.2d 953, 955 (1940)
221. For commentaries that do suggest some expansion of the Rule's application, see
Dukeminier, supra note 65, at 1907-08; Fratcher, Defeasance as a Restrictive Device in Michigan, 52
MICH. L. REv. 505, 513-17 (1954); Lynn & Ranser, Applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to Func-
tional Equivalents: Copps Chapel and the Woburn Church Revisited, 43 IowA L. REv. 36,45 (1957).
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of private land use devices by directly examining troublesome restric-
tions, and provide for increased termination and modification of servi-
tudes in light of the public interest.
The legislatures and courts can accomplish this unification. More-
over, the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) presents a unique
opportunity to chart the course for a broad integration of the law of pri-
vate land use control devices. Such a unification might serve as a model
for reforming other areas of real property law in which separate boxes of
rules have developed to address similar issues.
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